

**TELFORD & WREKIN COUNCIL**

**CABINET – 17 FEBRUARY 2022  
COUNCIL – 3 MARCH 2022**

**2021/22 TREASURY UPDATE REPORT AND 2022/23 TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY**

**REPORT OF THE CHIEF FINANCE OFFICER (DIRECTOR: FINANCE & HUMAN RESOURCES)**

**LEAD CABINET MEMBER – CLLR RAE EVANS**

**PART A – SUMMARY REPORT**

**1. SUMMARY OF MAIN PROPOSALS**

- 1.1** The report updates members on Treasury Management activities during 2021/22 to date and details the Treasury Strategy recommended to be adopted for 2022/23.

The strategy in 2021/22 and recent years has been to limit investments in third parties, which reduces the Council's exposure to counterparty risk, and to take advantage of lower interest rates for borrowing. Maintaining high levels of very cheap temporary financing has generated surplus treasury management returns of more than £26m since 2015/16 which has reduced the impact of Government cuts to the Council's grants and therefore helped to protect front line services.

It should be noted that the Council's budget for 2021/22 and the Cabinet's proposals issued for consultation in January 2022 for 2022/23 include an allowance for locking in all the anticipated financing requirement at fixed interest rates that are higher than current PWLB rates for any duration (from 1 year to 50 years) which ensures that the Council's budget in relation to Treasury Management is robust. The Council will continue to receive regular advice from a firm of independent expert advisors specialising in all aspects of local government treasury management and we will act in accordance with the advice received.

The report also sets out expected external financing requirements. We have an excellent track record of complying with all the prudential indicators and limits agreed by Council and are operating well within the overall approved credit ceiling. The proportion of the Council's net revenue budget used to service loan repayment is 8.2% in the current financial year. This compares to 10.4% for the average unitary authority. The Council has increased its external financing requirements in recent years to include investment in NuPlace which provides high quality homes for rent from a reliable landlord, mainly at market rent levels and has enabled brownfield sites to be brought back in to use. The council has also expanded the Property Investment Portfolio (the PIP) to attract and retain jobs for local people and to provide other regeneration benefits for our residents. An ancillary consequence of these investments is that it is anticipated they will bring long term capital growth which will strengthen the Council's balance sheet as well as generating revenue returns well in excess of the associated loan repayment charges. They will also bring other direct and indirect

financial and other benefits to the residents of the Borough including additional income from council tax, business rates and new homes bonus which will be used to help support front line services such as Adult Social Care, as well as protecting and creating jobs for local people. The Council's solar farm generates an index linked surplus of around £200k pa which is also used to help support front line services.

This report, and the Prudential Indicators report, which will be considered by Cabinet on 17<sup>th</sup> February and Full Council on 3<sup>rd</sup> March, set out our overall approach to treasury management and the controls that are put in place to ensure that council taxpayers' interests are protected and risks are managed as effectively as possible.

## **1.2 2021/22 TREASURY MANAGEMENT UPDATE**

The treasury portfolio at the end of December 2021 showed overall net indebtedness of £226.2m (borrowing: £248.7m less investments: £22.5m). Base rates increased from 0.10% to 0.25% on 16 December 2021 and it is anticipated that they will increase in the second quarter of 2022 and in the first quarter of 2023.

The borrowing strategy for 2021/22 is a continuation of that used for recent years which has provided considerable benefits to the Council, i.e. to:-

- take new borrowing within shorter maturities before gradually lengthening maturities, and
- take advantage of longer term loans when opportunities arise.

To date in 2021/22 part of our Equal Instalment of Principal PWLB loans have matured and 4 new PWLB loans totalling £20m have been taken (see 4.3) as part of a gradual move to taking some longer term borrowing to mitigate potential exposure to interest rate rises. Alongside this, short term borrowing has been used to fund short term cash flow requirements and take advantage of low interest rates.

As referred to above, a large part of the Council's total existing borrowing and planned further borrowings relates to funding projects which will deliver important and significant housing and regeneration benefits as well as generating some income. These are budgeted to generate returns in excess of the annual loan repayment charges and other operating costs.

The overall investment strategy for 2021/22 is to gain maximum benefit but with security of the principal sum invested being the primary consideration. Overall the weighted average return on all internal investments for the year to date was 0.0% because the paramount aim is to maintain security of principal so investments have generally been placed with the Government's Debt Management Office compared to a benchmark return for the period of 0.0%, based on the average overnight rate with the Debt Management Office (DMO).

A schedule of short-term investments as at 31 December 2021 is shown at Appendix F.

The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MIFID II) came into place on 3 January 2018 and the Council has opted to be categorised as a professional client which allows access to financial services and advice it may otherwise be unable to

obtain (such as advice from our treasury advisors). As part of the regulations, the authority must hold a minimum investment balance which is currently set at £10m.

The Council's contract for Treasury Advisor services ended on 31 December 2021 and following a procurement process Link Treasury Services Limited were appointed as Treasury Advisors for the 3 years commencing January 2022. Link currently provide treasury advisory services to over 400 public sector clients in the UK and are experienced and well-resourced to support our treasury function.

### **1.3 TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY 2022/23**

The Council's Treasury Management Strategy is set within the parameters of the relevant statute, guidance and accounting standards which include the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice for Treasury Management in Public Services and the Prudential Code. The Council has to have regard to these codes of practice when it prepares the Treasury Management Strategy Statement and Annual Investment Strategy, and also related reports during the financial year, which are taken to Full Council for approval.

Following extensive consultation, CIPFA published revised codes on 20th December 2021. The 2021 publication of the Prudential Code applies with immediate effect, however authorities may defer introducing the revised reporting requirements until the 2023/24 financial year should they wish as part of a soft launch. The revised reporting requirements include changes to the capital strategy, prudential indicators and investment reporting the Council will fully implement the revised reporting requirements from 2023/24.

The Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice (CIPFA, 2021) and the accompanying Guidance Notes set out good practice in treasury management and are complementary to this Code.

The Council is currently expected to need to borrow up to £100.3m in 2022/23 based on the current capital programme plans and will adopt a flexible approach to borrowing. In consultation with its treasury management advisors consideration will be given to affordability, maturity profile of existing external financing, interest rate and refinancing risk as well as borrowing source, which is usually expected to be other local authorities or the Public Works Loan Board, but may also include the LGA Municipal Bonds Agency, European Investment Bank or commercial sources, and any new opportunities which may arise.

The strategy for any investments will generally be to minimise investments in order to reduce counter-party risk and to reduce net interest costs as longer-term borrowing rates will tend to be greater than we are able to earn on new investments, but we will look to lengthen investment periods, where cash flow permits, to achieve higher interest rates within acceptable risk parameters. We would generally anticipate holding investments equal to the requirements set out under MIFID II, currently £10m. Maximum investment levels with counterparties will be set to ensure prudent diversification is achieved whilst recognising that the strict investment criteria that the Council applies severely reduces the number of suitable available counterparties and therefore sums with individual counterparties may be up to £15m at any one time.

The report also includes: the Council's Minimum Revenue Provision Statement and the Treasury Management Prudential Indicators for 2022/23.

## 2. **RECOMMENDATIONS**

### 2.1 Members are asked to

1. Note the treasury management activities for the first half year,
2. Note the Treasury Management Policy Statement (Appendix A), and
3. Recommend that Full Council approve the Treasury Strategy, including the Annual Investment Strategy for 2022/23 together with the associated Treasury Prudential Indicators (Appendix C), sources of borrowing and the Minimum Revenue Provision Statement, which will apply from 2021/22 onwards.

## 3. **SUMMARY IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

<b>COMMUNITY IMPACT</b>	Do these proposals contribute to specific priority plan objectives?	
	Yes	Maximisation of investment income whilst managing risks and minimising borrowing costs helps to support the Council's overall financial position and therefore the delivery of all service and policy objectives.
	Will the proposals impact on specific groups of people?	
	No	
<b>TARGET COMPLETION / DELIVERY DATE</b>	Part of ongoing Treasury Management Activities within the Treasury Management Strategy and Policy approved by Council.	
<b>FINANCIAL / VALUE FOR MONEY IMPACT</b>	Yes	Where appropriate these are detailed in the body of the report.
<b>LEGAL ISSUES</b>	Yes	<p>The Council's Treasury Strategy has to comply with the relevant statute, codes and guidance which are set out both in the main body of this report and its appendices. This reports demonstrates that the Council has had regard to the CIPFA guidance as required by the Local Government Act 2003.</p> <p>The Director: Finance &amp; Human Resources (Section 151 Officer) has responsibility for the administration of the financial affairs of the Council. In providing this report the Director: Finance &amp; Human Resources is meeting one of the responsibilities of the post contained within the Council's Constitution at Part 2, Article 12, paragraph 12.04(f) which states "The Chief Financial Officer will contribute to the promotion and maintenance of high standards of governance, audit, probity and propriety, risk management and the approval of the statement of accounts through</p>

		<p>provision of support to the Audit Committee.” This requirement within the Constitution reflects the requirements of the Local Government Finance act 1988 to appoint an officer who is responsible for the good financial administration of an authority.</p> <p>The Local Government Finance Act 1992 requires authorities to set a balanced budget; the proposals in this report, together with other budget-related reports, demonstrates that the Council meets this requirement. RP 17/01/22</p>
<b>OTHER IMPACTS, RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES</b>	Yes	The key opportunities and risks associated with treasury management activities are set out in the body of the report and in the Treasury Management Strategy and Policy approved by Council and will be regularly monitored throughout the year.
<b>IMPACT ON SPECIFIC WARDS</b>	No	

## PART B – ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

### 4. 2021/22 TREASURY MANAGEMENT UPDATE

#### 4.1 CURRENT PORTFOLIO POSITION

	<i>31 March 2021</i>	<i>31 Dec 2021</i>
	<b>Principal £m</b>	<b>Principal £m</b>
Fixed Rate Borrowing – PWLB	169.036	182.713
Fixed Rate Borrowing – LOBO	25.000	25.000
Fixed Rate Borrowing – Market	15.000	15.000
Variable Rate Borrowing – Temporary Market	72.049	26.029
<b>Total External Financing</b>	<b>281.085</b>	<b>248.742</b>
Investments (excl. NuPlace share capital)	20.652	22.465
<b>Total Investments</b>	<b>20.652</b>	<b>22.465</b>
<b>Net Indebtedness (excl. NuPlace)</b>	<b>260.433</b>	<b>226.277</b>
Investment in NuPlace	16.300	16.300
	<b>244.133</b>	<b>209.977</b>

#### 4.2 Interests Rates

On 16<sup>th</sup> December 2021 the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted 8-1 in favour of increasing the UK Bank Rate from 0.1%, where it been since the outset of the coronavirus pandemic in March 2020, to 0.25% in response to the underlying inflationary pressures and the possible upward impact of medium term inflation expectations. The Council’s Treasury Advisors are forecasting further rate

increases of 0.25% in both May 2022 and March 2023 with interest rates forecast to be 0.75% by the end of 2022/23. The Bank of England's Quantitative Easing programme has remained at £895bn throughout 2021/22.

### 4.3 Borrowing & Rescheduling

The borrowing strategy for the current year has been to borrow temporarily to take advantage of low interest rates where possible and to undertake new longer term borrowing initially in shorter maturities before gradually extending maturities.

#### Rescheduling

During 2021/22 no rescheduling of debt has taken place as market conditions have not been favourable, however the scope for opportunities is regularly monitored.

#### New Borrowing

Between the period 1 June 2021 (previous Member update) and 31 December 2021, £38.0m of temporary loans have been raised in order to fund short-term cash flow requirements. Interest rates have ranged from 0.01% to 0.07% - interest rates have remained low during this time. Outstanding temporary borrowing at 31 December 2021 was £26.0m

To date in 2021/22 part of our Equal Instalment of Principal PWLB loans have matured and 4 new PWLB loans, totalling £20m, have been taken since 1 June 2021.

Date	Loan Type	Period	Amount	Interest Rate
31/08/2021	Annuity	12 years	£5,000,000	1.23%
27/10/2021	Annuity	12 years	£5,000,000	1.69%
09/11/2021	Annuity	12 years	£5,000,000	1.65%
11/11/2021	Annuity	12 years	£5,000,000	1.49%

### 4.4 Treasury Management Investments

The strategy for the current year is: The Authority's objective when investing money for Treasury Management purposes is to strike an appropriate balance between risk and return.

The majority of the Council's treasury management investments are internally managed – currently just temporary investments for cash flow purposes.

#### Temporary Treasury Management Investments

The majority of funds are invested following consideration by Council officers in order to maximise returns from day to day cash flows. In total £5,490.3m of investments were placed between 1 June and 31 December. Interest rates have averaged 0.0% because the paramount aim is to maintain security of principal so investments have generally been placed with the Government's Debt Management Office and periods ranged from overnight deposits to 4 days. £22.465m temporary investments were held at 31 December 2021.

The Council has placed investments using the UK DMO Debt Management Account Deposit Facility when interest rates associated with this counterparty have been

negative. This effectively means that the Council has paid (albeit a very small amount) to ensure that investments have maximum security, in line with the CIPFA Prudential Code.

#### Longer Term Treasury Management Investments

We currently hold no long term Treasury Management Investments.

It should be noted that under the current guidance from our Treasury Advisors our investment policy would mean that new deposits with financial institutions should not be placed for longer than 13 months.

#### Overall Performance

Overall the weighted average return on all internal treasury management investments for the year to date was therefore 0.0% because the paramount aim is to maintain security of principal so investments have generally been placed with the Government's Debt Management Office compared to a benchmark return for the period of 0.0%, based on the average overnight rate with the Debt Management Office (DMO).

#### Overall Position and Exposure

A full analysis of all of the Council's treasury management investments at the end of December 2021 is shown in Appendix F.

Our current counterparty limit and maximum exposure is £15.0m with any one counterparty, with exception of the DMO which is unlimited as it is Government guaranteed. At the end of December 2021 the greatest exposure with a single counterparty was £10.7m with UK DMO (47.6% of the total portfolio).

The Council is guided by its Treasury advisers in assessing investments.

### **4.5 Leasing**

Each year the Council arranges operating and finance leases for assets such as vehicles, computers and equipment. This helps to spread the cost over a number of years.

During 2021/22 there has been one lease drawdown which was undertaken in December 2021. The drawdown consisted of a 5 year finance lease with Triple Point Leasing Partners for the acquisition of leisure equipment totalling £0.109m

## **5. TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR 2022/23**

### **5.1 Background**

The Council's Treasury Management Strategy is set within the parameters of the relevant statute, guidance and accounting standards which include the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice for Treasury Management in Public Services and the Prudential Code. The Council has to have regard to these codes of practice when it prepares the Treasury Management Strategy

Statement and Annual Investment Strategy, and also related reports during the financial year, which are taken to Full Council for approval.

Following extensive consultation, CIPFA published revised codes on 20th December 2021. The 2021 publication of the Prudential Code applies with immediate effect, however, authorities may defer introducing the revised reporting requirements until the 2023/24 financial year should they wish as part of a soft launch. The revised reporting requirements, as detailed below, include changes to the capital strategy, prudential indicators and investment reporting. The general ongoing principles of the revised Prudential Code apply with immediate effect.

The Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice (CIPFA, 2021) and the accompanying Guidance Notes set out good practice in treasury management and are complementary to this Code.

The revised codes will have the following implications:

- a requirement for the Council to adopt a new debt liability benchmark treasury indicator to support the financing risk management of the capital financing requirement;
- clarify what CIPFA expects a local authority to borrow for and what they do not view as appropriate. This will include the requirement to set a proportionate approach to commercial and service capital investment;
- address Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) issues within the Capital Strategy;
- regularly review commercial property, with a view to divest where appropriate;
- create new Investment Practices to manage risks associated with non-treasury investment (similar to the current Treasury Management Practices);
- ensure that any long term treasury investment is supported by a business model;
- a requirement to effectively manage liquidity and longer term cash flow requirements;
- amendment to TMP1 to address ESG policy within the treasury management risk framework;
- amendment to the knowledge and skills register for individuals involved in the treasury management function - to be proportionate to the size and complexity of the treasury management conducted by each council;
- a new requirement to clarify reporting requirements for service and commercial investment, (especially where supported by borrowing/leverage).

In addition, all investments and investment income must be attributed to one of the following three purposes: -

### **Treasury management**

Arising from the organisation's cash flows or treasury risk management activity, this type of investment represents balances which are only held until the cash is required for use. Treasury investments may also arise from other treasury risk management activity which seeks to prudently manage the risks, costs or income relating to existing or forecast debt or treasury investments.

### **Service delivery**

Investments held primarily and directly for the delivery of public services including housing, regeneration and local infrastructure. Returns on this category of investment which are funded by borrowing are permitted only in cases where the income is “either related to the financial viability of the project in question or otherwise incidental to the primary purpose”.

### **Commercial return**

Investments held primarily for financial return with no treasury management or direct service provision purpose. Risks on such investments should be proportionate to a council’s financial capacity – i.e., that ‘plausible losses’ could be absorbed in budgets or reserves without unmanageable detriment to local services. An authority must not borrow to invest primarily for financial return.

## **5.1.1 The CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice**

The Council is required to set a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low-risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Council’s low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.

The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Council’s capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Council, essentially the longer-term cash flow planning, to ensure that the Council can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer-term cash may involve arranging long or short-term loans or using longer-term cash flow surpluses. On occasion, when it is prudent and economic, any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Council risk or cost objectives.

The contribution the treasury management function makes to the authority is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.

CIPFA defines treasury management as:

*“The management of the local authority’s borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”*

Whilst any commercial initiatives or loans to third parties will impact on the treasury function, these activities are generally classed as non-treasury activities, (arising usually from capital expenditure), and are separate from the day-to-day treasury management activities.

## Reporting requirements

### Capital Strategy

The CIPFA 2017 Prudential Code and the Code of Practice for Treasury Management Code (and the subsequent 2021 revised Codes) require all local authorities to prepare a capital strategy report which will provide the following:

- a high-level long-term overview of how capital expenditure, capital financing and treasury management activity contribute to the provision of services
- an overview of how the associated risk is managed
- the implications for future financial sustainability

The aim of this capital strategy is to ensure that all elected members on the full council fully understand the overall long-term policy objectives and resulting capital strategy requirements, governance procedures and risk appetite.

### Treasury Management reporting

The Council is currently required to receive and approve, as a minimum, three main treasury reports each year, which incorporate a variety of policies, estimates and actuals.

- a. Prudential and treasury indicators and treasury strategy** (this report) - The first, and most important report is forward looking and covers:
  - the capital plans, (including prudential indicators);
  - a minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy, (how residual capital expenditure is charged to revenue over time);
  - the treasury management strategy, (how the investments and borrowings are to be organised), including treasury indicators; and
  - an investment strategy, (the parameters on how investments are to be managed).
- b. A mid-year treasury management report** – This is primarily a progress report and will update members on the capital position, amending prudential indicators as necessary, and whether any policies require revision.
- c. An annual treasury report** – This is a backward-looking review document and provides details of a selection of actual prudential and treasury indicators and actual treasury operations compared to the estimates within the strategy.

The mid-year treasury management report and the annual treasury report are presented as one report following the completion of closedown.

The above reports are required to be adequately scrutinised, a role which is undertaken by the Audit Committee.

### Treasury Management Strategy for 2022/23

The strategy for 2022/23 covers two main areas:

### Capital issues

- the capital expenditure plans and the associated prudential indicators; and
- the minimum revenue provision (MRP) policy.

### Treasury management issues

- the current treasury position;
- treasury indicators which limit the treasury risk and activities of the Council;
- prospects for interest rates;
- the borrowing strategy;
- policy on borrowing in advance of need;
- debt rescheduling;
- the investment strategy;
- creditworthiness policy; and
- the policy on use of external service providers.

These elements cover the requirements of the Local Government Act 2003, DLUHC Investment Guidance, DLUHC MRP Guidance, the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code.

## 5.1.2 External Context

**Prospects for interest rates** - The Council has appointed Link Group as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Council to formulate a view on interest rates. Link provided the following forecasts on 20<sup>th</sup> December 2021. These are forecasts for certainty rates, gilt yields plus 80 bps.

Link Group Interest Rate View 20.12.21														
	Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25
BANK RATE	0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
3 month ave earnings	0.20	0.30	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
6 month ave earnings	0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10
12 month ave earnings	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
5 yr PWLB	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
10 yr PWLB	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30
25 yr PWLB	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50
50 yr PWLB	1.50	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30

*Additional notes by Link on this forecast table: -*

- *LIBOR and LIBID rates will cease from the end of 2021. Work is currently progressing to replace LIBOR with a rate based on SONIA (Sterling Overnight Index Average). In the meantime, our forecasts are based on expected average earnings by local authorities for 3 to 12 months.*
- *Our forecasts for average earnings are averages i.e., rates offered by individual banks may differ significantly from these averages, reflecting their different needs for borrowing short term cash at any one point in time.*

Over the last two years, the coronavirus outbreak has done huge economic damage to the UK and to economies around the world. After the Bank of England took emergency action in March 2020 to cut Bank Rate to 0.10%, it left Bank Rate unchanged at its subsequent meetings until raising it to 0.25% at its meeting on 16<sup>th</sup> December 2021.

As shown in the forecast table above, the forecast for Bank Rate now includes four increases, one in December 2021 to 0.25%, then quarter 2 of 2022 to 0.50%, quarter 1 of 2023 to 0.75%, quarter 1 of 2024 to 1.00% and, finally, one in quarter 1 of 2025 to 1.25%.

### **Significant risks to the forecasts**

- **Mutations** of the virus render current vaccines ineffective, and tweaked vaccines to combat these mutations are delayed, or cannot be administered fast enough to prevent further lockdowns. 25% of the population not being vaccinated is also a significant risk to the NHS being overwhelmed and lockdowns being the only remaining option.
- **Labour and supply shortages** prove more enduring and disruptive and depress economic activity.
- **The Monetary Policy Committee** acts too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- **The Monetary Policy Committee** tightens monetary policy too late to ward off building inflationary pressures.
- **The Government** acts too quickly to cut expenditure to balance the national budget.
- **UK / EU trade arrangements** – if there was a major impact on trade flows and financial services due to complications or lack of co-operation in sorting out significant remaining issues.
- **German general election** in September 2021. Germany faces months of uncertainty while a new coalition government is cobbled together after the indecisive result of the election. Once that coalition is formed, Angela Merkel's tenure as Chancellor will end and will leave a hole in overall EU leadership.
- **Longer term US treasury yields** rise strongly and pull gilt yields up higher than forecast.
- **Major stock markets** e.g., in the US, become increasingly judged as being over-valued and susceptible to major price corrections. Central banks become increasingly exposed to the "moral hazard" risks of having to buy shares and corporate bonds to reduce the impact of major financial market selloffs on the general economy.
- **Geopolitical risks**, for example in Iran, North Korea, but also in Europe and Middle Eastern countries; on-going global power influence struggles between Russia/China/US. These could lead to increasing safe-haven flows.

**The balance of risks to the UK economy: -**

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is now to the downside, including residual risks from COVID and its variants - both domestically and their potential effects worldwide.

**Forecasts for Bank Rate** – it is not expected that Bank Rate will go up fast after the initial rate rise as the supply potential of the economy is not likely to have taken a major hit during the pandemic: it should, therefore, be able to cope well with meeting demand after supply shortages subside over the next year, without causing inflation to remain elevated in the medium-term, or to inhibit inflation from falling back towards the MPC's 2% target after the spike up to around 5%. The forecast includes four increases in Bank Rate over the three-year forecast period to March 2025, ending at 1.25%. However, it is likely that these forecasts will need changing within a relatively short timeframe for the following reasons: -

- We do not know how severe an impact Omicron could have on the economy and whether there will be another lockdown or similar and, if there is, whether there would be significant fiscal support from the Government for businesses and jobs.
- There were already increasing grounds for viewing the economic recovery as running out of steam during the autumn and now into the winter. And then along came Omicron to pose a significant downside threat to economic activity. This could lead into stagflation, or even into recession, which would then pose a dilemma for the MPC as to whether to focus on combating inflation or supporting economic growth through keeping interest rates low.
- Will some current key supply shortages spill over into causing economic activity in some sectors to take a significant hit?
- Rising gas and electricity prices in October and next April and increases in other prices caused by supply shortages and increases in taxation next April, are already going to deflate consumer spending power without the MPC having to take any action on Bank Rate to cool inflation.
- On the other hand, consumers are sitting on over £160bn of excess savings left over from the pandemic so when will they spend this sum, in part or in total?
- It looks as if the economy coped well with the end of furlough on 30<sup>th</sup> September. It is estimated that there were around 1 million people who came off furlough then and there was not a huge spike up in unemployment. The other side of the coin is that vacancies have been hitting record levels so there is a continuing acute shortage of workers. This is a potential danger area if this shortage drives up wages which then feed through into producer prices and the prices of services i.e., a second-round effect that the MPC would have to act against if it looked like gaining significant momentum.
- We also recognise there could be further nasty surprises on the COVID front beyond the Omicron mutation.
- If the UK invokes article 16 of the Brexit deal over the dislocation in trading arrangements with Northern Ireland, this has the potential to end up in a no-deal Brexit.

In summary, with the high level of uncertainty prevailing on several different fronts, it is likely that these forecasts will be revised again over the next few months - in line with what the new news is.

It should also be borne in mind that Bank Rate being cut to 0.25% and then to 0.10%, were emergency measures to deal with the COVID crisis hitting the UK in March 2020. At any time, the MPC could decide to simply take away such emergency cuts on no other grounds than they are no longer warranted, and as a step forward in the return to normalisation. In addition, any Bank Rate under 1% is both highly unusual and highly supportive of economic growth.

**Forecasts for PWLB rates and gilt and treasury yields** - since the start of 2021, we have seen a lot of volatility in gilt yields, and hence PWLB rates. As the interest forecast table for PWLB certainty rates above shows, there is forecast to be a steady, but slow, rise in both Bank Rate and gilt yields during the forecast period to March 2025, though there will doubtless be a lot of unpredictable volatility during this forecast period.

While monetary policy in the UK will have a major impact on gilt yields, there is also a need to consider the potential impact that rising treasury yields in America could have on our gilt yields. As an average since 2011, there has been a 75% correlation between movements in US 10-year treasury yields and UK 10-year gilt yields. This is a significant upward risk exposure to our forecasts for longer term PWLB rates. However, gilt yields and treasury yields do not always move in unison.

**US treasury yields** - during the first part of 2021, US President Biden's, and the Democratic party's, determination to push through a \$1.9trn (equivalent to 8.8% of GDP) fiscal boost for the US economy as a recovery package from the COVID pandemic was what unsettled financial markets. However, this was in addition to the \$900bn support package already passed in December 2020. This was then followed by additional Democratic ambition to spend \$1trn on infrastructure, (which was eventually passed by both houses later in 2021), and an even larger sum on an American families plan over the next decade; this is still caught up in Democrat / Republican haggling. Financial markets were alarmed that all this stimulus was happening at a time when: -

1. A fast vaccination programme had enabled a rapid opening up of the economy during 2021.
2. The economy was growing strongly during the first half of 2021 although it has weakened overall during the second half.
3. It started from a position of little spare capacity due to less severe lockdown measures than in many other countries.
4. And the Fed was still providing substantial stimulus through monthly QE purchases during 2021.

It was not much of a surprise that a combination of these factors would eventually cause an excess of demand in the economy which generated strong inflationary pressures. This has eventually been recognised by the Fed at its December meeting with an aggressive response to damp inflation down during 2022 and 2023.

At its 3<sup>rd</sup> November Fed meeting, the Fed decided to make a start on tapering its \$120bn per month of QE purchases so that they ended next June. However, at its 15<sup>th</sup>

December meeting it doubled the pace of tapering so that they will end all purchases in February. These purchases are currently acting as downward pressure on treasury yields and so it would be expected that Treasury yields will rise over the taper period and after the taper ends, all other things being equal. The Fed also forecast that it expected there would be three rate rises in 2022 of 0.25% from near zero currently, followed by three in 2023 and two in 2024, taking rates back above 2% to a neutral level for monetary policy.

There are also possible downside risks from the huge sums of cash that the UK populace have saved during the pandemic; when savings accounts earn little interest, it is likely that some of this cash mountain could end up being invested in bonds and so push up demand for bonds and support their prices i.e., this would help to keep their yields down. How this will interplay with the Bank of England eventually getting round to not reinvesting maturing gilts and then later selling gilts, will be interesting to monitor.

There is likely to be exceptional volatility and unpredictability in respect of gilt yields and PWLB rates due to the following factors: -

- How strongly will changes in gilt yields be correlated to changes in US treasury yields (see below)? Over 10 years since 2011 there has been an average 75% correlation between movements in US treasury yields and gilt yields. However, from time to time these two yields can diverge. Lack of spare economic capacity and rising inflationary pressures are viewed as being much greater dangers in the US than in the UK. This could mean that central bank rates will end up rising earlier and higher in the US than in the UK if inflationary pressures were to escalate; the consequent increases in treasury yields could well spill over to cause (lesser) increases in gilt yields. There is, therefore, an upside risk to forecasts for gilt yields due to this correlation. The Link Group forecasts have included a risk of a 75% correlation between the two yields.
- Will the Fed take action to counter increasing treasury yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- Would the MPC act to counter increasing gilt yields if they rise beyond a yet unspecified level?
- How strong will inflationary pressures actually turn out to be in both the US and the UK and so put upward pressure on treasury and gilt yields?
- How will central banks implement their new average or sustainable level inflation monetary policies?
- How well will central banks manage the withdrawal of QE purchases of their national bonds i.e., without causing a panic reaction in financial markets as happened in the “taper tantrums” in the US in 2013?
- Will exceptional volatility be focused on the short or long-end of the yield curve, or both?

As the US financial markets are, by far, the biggest financial markets in the world, any upward trend in treasury yields will invariably impact and influence financial markets in other countries. Inflationary pressures and erosion of surplus economic capacity look much stronger in the US compared to those in the UK, which would suggest that Fed rate increases eventually needed to suppress inflation, are likely to be faster and

stronger than Bank Rate increases in the UK. This is likely to put upward pressure on treasury yields which could then spill over into putting upward pressure on UK gilt yields.

The forecasts are also predicated on an assumption that there is no break-up of the Eurozone or EU within the forecasting period, despite the major challenges that are looming up, and that there are no major ructions in international relations, especially between the US and Russia, China / North Korea and Iran, which have a major impact on international trade and world GDP growth.

**The balance of risks to medium to long term PWLB rates: -**

- There is a balance of upside risks to forecasts for medium to long term PWLB rates.

**A new era for local authority investing – a fundamental shift in central bank monetary policy** - one of the key results of the pandemic has been a fundamental rethinking and shift in monetary policy by major central banks like the Fed, the Bank of England and the ECB, to tolerate a higher level of inflation than in the previous two decades when inflation was the prime target to bear down on so as to stop it going above a target rate. There is now also a greater emphasis on other targets for monetary policy than just inflation, especially on ‘achieving broad and inclusive “maximum” employment in its entirety’ in the US, before consideration would be given to increasing rates.

- The Fed in America has gone furthest in adopting a monetary policy based on a clear goal of allowing the inflation target to be symmetrical, (rather than a ceiling to keep under), so that inflation averages out the dips down and surges above the target rate, over an unspecified period of time.
- The Bank of England has also amended its target for monetary policy so that inflation should be ‘sustainably over 2%’ before starting on raising Bank Rate and the ECB now has a similar policy.
- For local authorities, this means that investment interest rates and very short term PWLB rates will not be rising as quickly or as high as in previous decades when the economy recovers from a downturn and the recovery eventually runs out of spare capacity to fuel continuing expansion.
- Labour market liberalisation since the 1970s has helped to break the wage-price spirals that fuelled high levels of inflation and has now set inflation on a lower path which makes this shift in monetary policy practicable. In addition, recent changes in flexible employment practices, the rise of the gig economy and technological changes, will all help to lower inflationary pressures.
- Governments will also be concerned to see interest rates stay lower as every rise in central rates will add to the cost of vastly expanded levels of national debt; (in the UK this is £21bn for each 1% rise in rates). On the other hand, higher levels of inflation will help to erode the real value of total public debt.

## Investment and borrowing rates

- Investment returns are expected to improve in 2022/23. However, while markets are pricing in a series of Bank Rate hikes, actual economic circumstances may see the MPC fall short of these elevated expectations.
- Borrowing interest rates fell to historically very low rates as a result of the COVID crisis and the quantitative easing operations of the Bank of England and still remain at historically low levels. The policy of avoiding new borrowing by running down spare cash balances has served local authorities well over the last few years.
- On 25.11.20, the Chancellor announced the conclusion to the review of margins over gilt yields for PWLB rates which had been increased by 100 bps in October 2019. The standard and certainty margins were reduced by 100 bps but a prohibition was introduced to deny access to borrowing from the PWLB for any local authority which had purchase of assets for yield in its three-year capital programme. The current margins over gilt yields are as follows: -
  - **PWLB Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
  - **PWLB Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80 basis points (G+80bps)
  - **PWLB HRA Standard Rate** is gilt plus 100 basis points (G+100bps)
  - **PWLB HRA Certainty Rate** is gilt plus 80bps (G+80bps)
  - **Local Infrastructure Rate** is gilt plus 60bps (G+60bps)
- **Borrowing for capital expenditure** - our long-term (beyond 10 years), forecast for Bank Rate is 2.00%. As some PWLB certainty rates are currently below 2.00%, there remains value in considering long-term borrowing from the PWLB where appropriate. Temporary borrowing rates are likely, however, to remain near Bank Rate and may also prove attractive as part of a balanced debt portfolio. In addition, there are also some cheap alternative sources of long-term borrowing if an authority is seeking to avoid a “cost of carry” but also wishes to mitigate future re-financing risk.
- While the authority will not be able to avoid borrowing to finance new capital expenditure and to replace maturing debt, there will be a cost of carry, (the difference between higher borrowing costs and lower investment returns), to any new borrowing that causes a temporary increase in cash balances.

### 5.1.3 Local Context

The Authority’s current level of external financing and investments is set out at Appendix B.

The underlying need to borrow for capital purposes is measured by the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR, together with Usable Reserves, are the core drivers of the Authority’s Treasury Management activities.

The Authority is able to borrow funds in excess of the current level of its CFR up to the projected level in 2024/25. The Authority is likely to only borrow in advance of need if it felt the benefits of borrowing at interest rates now compared to where they are expected to be in the future, outweighs the current cost and risks associated with investing the proceeds until the borrowing was actually required.

The forecasted movement in the CFR in coming years is one of the Prudential Indicators (PIs). The estimates, based on the current Revenue Budget and Capital Programmes, are:

**Table 1: Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)**

	<b>31.03.21 Actual £m</b>	<b>31.03.22 Estimate £m</b>	<b>31.03.23 Estimate £m</b>	<b>31.03.24 Estimate £m</b>	<b>31.03.25 Estimate £m</b>
Capital Financing Requirement	480.078	505.711	601.793	671.095	682.942
Less: Other long term liabilities*	(50.398)	(50.880)	(47.888)	(44.547)	(41.146)
<b>Loans CFR</b>	<b>429.680</b>	<b>454.831</b>	<b>553.905</b>	<b>626.548</b>	<b>641.796</b>
Less: External Borrowing**	(281.085)	(234.042)	(215.310)	(206.535)	(197.715)
<b>Internal (over) Borrowing</b>	<b>148.595</b>	<b>220.789</b>	<b>338.595</b>	<b>420.013</b>	<b>444.080</b>
Less: Balance Sheet resources	(169.247)	(125.247)	(113.247)	(105.247)	(102.247)
<b>Treasury Investments / (New Borrowing)</b>	<b>20.652</b>	<b>(95.542)</b>	<b>(225.348)</b>	<b>(314.766)</b>	<b>(341.833)</b>

\* leases and PFI liabilities that form part of the Authority's total debt

\*\* shows only loans which the Authority is committed and excludes optional refinancing

The underlying need to borrow for capital purposes is measured by the Capital Financing Requirement (CFR), while usable reserves and working capital are the underlying resources available for investment. The above table shows an increasing CFR due to the capital programme, but minimal investments, and will require the Council to undertake additional longer term borrowing. Conversion from temporary borrowing to fixed long-term borrowing may also be required at the most appropriate time for the Council, dependent on market conditions.

The row relating to external borrowing includes debt associated with funding the Council's Housing Investment Programme through NuPlace, the Telford Growth Fund/PIP investments, solar farm and other investments that have an element of income generation. The anticipated income from these projects is projected to generate a surplus after funding the debt and operational costs which will be used to support front line services. The outstanding debt relating to the Housing Investment Programme could be repaid by the eventual sale, in many years' time, of some or all of the properties held by the Council's wholly owned company.

CIPFA's Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities recommends that the Authority's total debt should be lower than its highest forecast CFR over the next three years. The CFR Table above shows that the Authority expects to fully comply with this recommendation.


**Liability benchmark:** To compare the Council's actual borrowing against an alternative strategy, a liability benchmark has been calculated showing the lowest risk

level of borrowing. This assumes the same forecasts as table 1 above, but that cash and investment balances are kept to a minimum level of £15m at each year-end to maintain sufficient liquidity but minimise credit risk.

**Table 2: Liability benchmark**

	<b>31.3.21 Actual £m</b>	<b>31.3.22 Estimate £m</b>	<b>31.3.23 Forecast £m</b>	<b>31.3.24 Forecast £m</b>	<b>31.3.25 Forecast £m</b>
Loans CFR	429.680	454.831	553.905	626.548	641.796
Less: Balance Sheet Resources	(169.247)	(125.247)	(113.247)	(105.247)	(102.247)
<b>Net Loans Requirement</b>	<b>260.433</b>	<b>329.584</b>	<b>440.658</b>	<b>521.301</b>	<b>539.549</b>
Plus: Liquidity Allowance	20.652	15.000	15.000	15.000	15.000
<b>Liability Benchmark</b>	<b>281.085</b>	<b>344.584</b>	<b>455.658</b>	<b>536.301</b>	<b>554.549</b>

Following on from the medium-term forecasts in table 2 above, the long-term liability benchmark has been calculated (see chart below) and assumes capital expenditure funded by borrowing in line with the capital programme, minimum revenue provision on new capital expenditure based on appropriate asset lives and balance sheet resources reducing in line with anticipated use of reserves.



The liability benchmark is a projection of the amount of loan debt outstanding which the authority needs each year into the future, in order to fund its existing debt liabilities, planned prudential borrowing and other cashflows.

This is shown by the gap between the authority's existing loans which are still outstanding at a given future date, and the authority's future need for borrowing (as shown by the liability benchmark).

It therefore shows how closely the existing loans book fits the future needs of the authority based only on its current plans. Any shortfall will need to be met by future borrowing; any excess will have to be invested (unless existing borrowing is prematurely repaid). Refinancing risk, interest rate risk and credit risk can be minimized or reduced by ensuring that the existing loans portfolio shows a profile close to the liability benchmark.

For Telford & Wrekin Council, the benchmark shows that our current level of external borrowing is below the amount needed to fund commitments and therefore future borrowing will be required.

In particular, the liability benchmark identifies the maturities needed for new borrowing, in order to match future liabilities. It therefore avoids borrowing for too long or too short. Local authorities have sometimes used the CFR as their benchmark of borrowing needs, but this is likely to result in substantial over-borrowing because authorities generally have systemic in-hand cashflows and balances which keep actual debt (net of treasury investments) well below the CFR. Borrowing needs are based on cashflows, not the CFR – accepting the need for a reasonable but not excessive holding of short term investments for liquidity management.

The liability benchmark makes no assumption about the level of future prudential borrowing in as yet unknown capital budgets. This avoids making large assumptions which may prove to be spectacularly wrong; but the main reason is that it enables the benchmark to be compared like-for-life with the existing loans portfolio to identify the future borrowing and investment needs arising from the authority's existing plans. It shows us what the current debt maturity profile should be to match the authority's current borrowing commitments less MRP and other forecast cashflows. Matching the portfolio to the need minimises treasury risks.

**Treasury Management Indicators:** There is a requirement under the Local Government Act 2003 for local authorities to have regard to CIPFA's Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities (the "CIPFA Prudential Code") when setting and reviewing their Treasury Management and Prudential Indicators. These indicators are used to measure and manage the Authority's measures exposure to treasury management risks including –

- Security
- Liquidity
- Interest Rate Exposure
- Maturity Structure of Fixed Rate Borrowing
- Principle sums invested for periods longer than a year

Treasury Management indicators are detailed in Appendix C.

#### **5.1.4 Borrowing Strategy**

The Authority holds £248.713m of loans as at 31 December 2021, a decrease of £19.173m on the previous year, due to positive cash flow and as part of its strategy for

funding previous years' capital programmes. It is anticipated that the total cumulative borrowing will increase to £301.7m by the end of 2021/22 in line with the approved Capital Programme.

**Objectives:** The Authority's chief objective when borrowing money is to strike an appropriately low risk balance between securing low interest costs and achieving certainty of those costs over the period for which funds are required. The flexibility to renegotiate loans should the Authority's long-term plans change is a secondary objective.

**Strategy:** Given the significant cuts to public expenditure and in particular to local government funding, the Authority's borrowing strategy continues to address the key issue of affordability without compromising the longer-term stability of the debt portfolio. With short-term interest rates currently much lower than long-term rates, it is likely to be more cost effective in the short-term to either use internal resources, or to borrow short-term loans instead.

By doing so, the Authority is able to reduce net borrowing costs (despite foregone investment income) and reduce overall treasury risk. Whilst such a strategy is most likely to be beneficial over the next 1 – 2 years as official interest rates remain low, it is unlikely to be sustainable in the medium-term and a gradual move into longer term borrowing, when the opportunity arises will be taken. The benefits of internal borrowing will be monitored regularly against the potential for incurring additional costs by deferring borrowing into future years when long-term borrowing rates are forecast to rise modestly. External advisors will assist the Authority with this 'cost of carry' and breakeven analysis. Its output may determine whether the Authority borrows additional sums at long-term fixed rates in 2021/22 with a view to keeping future interest costs low, even if this causes additional cost in the short-term.

Historically, the Authority has raised the majority of its long-term borrowing from the PWLB and this is likely a major source of borrowing going forward. The Authority may also consider alternative options for borrowing any long-term loans, such as banks, pension funds and local authorities, and the possibility of issuing bonds and similar instruments, in order to lower interest costs and reduce over-reliance on one source of funding in line with the CIPFA Code. PWLB loans are no longer available to local authorities planning to buy investment assets primarily for yield; the Authority intends to avoid this activity in order to retain its access to PWLB loans.

Alternatively, the Authority may arrange forward starting loans, where the interest rate is fixed in advance, but the cash is received in later years. This would enable certainty of cost to be achieved without suffering a cost of carry in the intervening period.

In addition, the Authority may borrow further short-term loans to cover unplanned cash flow shortages.

**Sources of Borrowing:** The approved sources of long-term and short-term borrowing are:

- HM Treasury's PWLB lending facility (formerly PWLB)
- any institution approved for investments (see below)
- any other bank or building society authorised to operate in the UK

- any other UK public sector body
- UK public and private sector pension funds
- capital market bond investors
- UK Municipal Bonds Agency plc and other special purpose companies created to enable local authority bond issues
- Registered Housing providers
- Capital market bond investors
- Community Municipal Investments (Bond or Loan) raised from the general public (including a climate change investment opportunity).

**Other sources of debt finance:** In addition, capital finance may be raised by the following methods that are not borrowing, but may be classed as other debt liabilities:

- leasing
- hire purchase
- Private Finance Initiative
- sale and leaseback

**Municipal Bonds Agency:** UK Municipal Bonds Agency plc was established in 2014 by the Local Government Association as an alternative to the PWLB. It issues bonds on the capital markets and lends the proceeds to local authorities. This is a more complicated source of finance than the PWLB for two reasons: borrowing authorities will be required to provide bond investors with a guarantee to refund their investment in the event that the agency is unable to meet its obligations for any reason; and there will be a lead time of several months between committing to borrow and knowing the interest rate payable.

**LOBOs:** The Authority holds £25.0m of LOBO (Lender's Option Borrower's Option) loans where the lender has the option to propose an increase in the interest rate at set dates, following which the Authority has the option to either accept the new rate or to repay the loan at no additional cost. £20.0m of these LOBOs have remaining options prior to the end of the financial year, and although the Authority understands that lenders are very unlikely to exercise their options in the current low interest rate environment, there remains an element of refinancing opportunity. Rates payable were competitive compared to PWLB rates at the time that the loans were taken out. The Authority will take the option to repay LOBO loans at no cost if it has the opportunity to do so. Total borrowing via LOBO loans will not increase from the current £25.0m.

**Short-term and variable rate loans:** These loans leave the Authority exposed to the risk of short-term interest rate rises and are therefore subject to the interest rate exposure limits in the treasury management indicators below. Financial derivatives may be used to manage this interest rate risk.

**Borrowing in advance of need:** The Council will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be within forward approved Capital Financing

Requirement estimates and will be considered carefully to ensure that value for money can be demonstrated and that the Council can ensure the security of such funds.

Risks associated with any borrowing in advance activity will be subject to prior appraisal and subsequent reporting through the mid-year or annual reporting mechanism.

**Debt rescheduling:** The PWLB allows authorities to repay loans before maturity and either pay a premium or receive a discount according to a set formula based on current interest rates. Other lenders may also be prepared to negotiate premature redemption terms. The Authority may take advantage of this and replace some loans with new loans, or repay loans without replacement, where this is expected to lead to an overall cost saving or a reduction in risk.

## 5.2 Treasury Investment Strategy

The Authority holds invested funds, representing income received in advance of expenditure plus balances and reserves held. In the current financial year, the Authority’s investment balance has ranged between £14.3m and £55.6m. We expect to maintain an investment balance of between £10.0m and £20.0m in the forthcoming year – unless the MIFID requirement is relaxed in which case the amount of investment held may reduce.

**Objectives:** The CIPFA Code requires the Authority to invest its funds prudently, and to have regard to the security and liquidity of its investments before seeking the highest rate of return, or yield. The Authority’s objective when investing money is to strike an appropriate balance between risk and return, minimising the risk of incurring losses from defaults and the risk of receiving unsuitably low investment income. Where balances are expected to be invested for more than one year, the Authority will aim to achieve a total return that is equal or higher than the prevailing rate of inflation, in order to maintain the spending power of the sum invested.

**Strategy:** All of the Authority’s surplus cash remains invested in the UK Government through the Debt Management Account Deposit Facility (DMADF), short-term unsecured bank deposits and money market funds. This diversification of investments will represent a continuation of the strategy adopted in 2021/22.

**Business models:** Under the new IFRS 9 standard, the accounting for certain investments depends on the Authority’s “business model” for managing them. The Authority aims to achieve value from its internally managed treasury investments by a business model of collecting the contractual cash flows and therefore, where other criteria are also met, these investments will continue to be accounted for at amortised cost.

**Approved counterparties:** The Authority may invest its surplus funds with any of the counterparty types listed in the table below, subject to the cash limits (per counterparty) and the time limits shown.

Sector	Time limit	Counterparty limit	Sector limit
The UK Government	50 years	Unlimited	n/a

Sector	Time limit	Counterparty limit	Sector limit
Local authorities & other government entities	25 years	£15.0m	Unlimited
Secured investments*	25 years	£15.0m	Unlimited
Banks (unsecured)*	13 months	£15.0m	Unlimited
Building societies (unsecured)*	13 months	£15.0m	Unlimited
Registered providers (unsecured)*	5 years	£15.0m	Unlimited
Money market funds*	n/a	£10.0m	Unlimited
Strategic pooled funds	n/a	£10.0m	Unlimited
Real estate investment trusts	n/a	£10.0m	Unlimited
Other investments*	5 years	£7.5m	Unlimited

This table must be read in conjunction with the notes below

**\* Minimum credit rating:** Treasury investments in the sectors marked with an asterisk will only be made with entities whose lowest published long-term credit rating is no lower than A-. Where available, the credit rating relevant to the specific investment or class of investment is used, otherwise the counterparty credit rating is used. However, investment decisions are never made solely based on credit ratings, and all other relevant factors including external advice will be taken into account.

For entities without published credit ratings, investments may be made either (a) where external advice indicates the entity to be of similar credit quality; or (b) to a maximum of one third of the available investment per counterparty as part of a diversified pool.

**Government:** Loans to, bonds and bills issued or guaranteed by national governments, regional and local authorities and multilateral development banks. These investments are not subject to bail-in, and there is a lower risk of insolvency, although they are not without risk. Investments with the UK Government may be made in unlimited amounts for up to 50 years.

**Secured investments:** Investments secured on the borrower's assets, which limits the potential losses in the event of insolvency. The amount and quality of the security will be a key factor in the investment decision. Covered bonds and reverse repurchase agreements with banks and building societies are exempt from bail-in. Where there is no investment specific credit rating, but the collateral upon which the investment is secured has a credit rating, the higher of the collateral credit rating and the counterparty credit rating will be used. The combined secured and unsecured investments with any one counterparty will not exceed the cash limit for secured investments.

**Banks and building societies (unsecured):** Accounts, deposits, certificates of deposit and senior unsecured bonds with banks and building societies, other than multilateral development banks. These investments are subject to the risk of credit loss via a bail-in should the regulator determine that the bank is failing or likely to fail. See below for arrangements relating to operational bank accounts.

**Registered providers (unsecured):** Loans to, and bonds issued or guaranteed by, registered providers of social housing or registered social landlords, formerly known as housing associations. These bodies are regulated by the Regulator of Social Housing (in England), the Scottish Housing Regulator, the Welsh Government and the Department for Communities (in Northern Ireland). As providers of public services, they retain the likelihood of receiving government support if needed.

**Money market funds:** Pooled funds that offer same-day or short notice liquidity and very low or no price volatility by investing in short-term money markets. They have the advantage over bank accounts of providing wide diversification of investment risks, coupled with the services of a professional fund manager in return for a small fee. Although no sector limit applies to money market funds, the Authority will take care to diversify its liquid investments over a variety of providers to ensure access to cash at all times.

**Strategic pooled funds:** Bond, equity and property funds that offer enhanced returns over the longer term but are more volatile in the short term. These allow the Authority to diversify into asset classes other than cash without the need to own and manage the underlying investments. Because these funds have no defined maturity date, but are available for withdrawal after a notice period, their performance and continued suitability in meeting the Authority's investment objectives will be monitored regularly.

**Real estate investment trusts:** Shares in companies that invest mainly in real estate and pay the majority of their rental income to investors in a similar manner to pooled property funds. As with property funds, REITs offer enhanced returns over the longer term, but are more volatile especially as the share price reflects changing demand for the shares as well as changes in the value of the underlying properties.

**Other investments:** This category covers treasury investments not listed above, for example unsecured corporate bonds and company loans. Non-bank companies cannot be bailed-in but can become insolvent placing the Authority's investment at risk.

**Operational bank accounts:** The Authority may incur operational exposures, for example through current accounts, collection accounts and merchant acquiring services, to any UK bank with credit ratings no lower than BBB- and with assets greater than £25 billion. These are not classed as investments but are still subject to the risk of a bank bail-in, and balances will therefore be kept below £15.0m per bank. The Bank of England has stated that in the event of failure, banks with assets greater than £25 billion are more likely to be bailed-in than made insolvent, increasing the chance of the Authority maintaining operational continuity.

**Risk assessment and credit ratings:** Credit ratings are obtained and monitored by the Authority's treasury advisers, who will notify changes in ratings as they occur. Where an entity has its credit rating downgraded so that it fails to meet the approved investment criteria then:

- no new investments will be made,
- any existing investments that can be recalled or sold at no cost will be, and
- full consideration will be given to the recall or sale of all other existing investments with the affected counterparty

Where a credit rating agency announces that a credit rating is on review for possible downgrade (also known as “rating watch negative” or “credit watch negative”) so that it may fall below the approved rating criteria, then only investments that can be withdrawn on the next working day will be made with that organisation until the outcome of the review is announced. This policy will not apply to negative outlooks, which indicate a long-term direction of travel rather than an imminent change of rating.

**Other information on the security of investments:** The Authority understands that credit ratings are good, but not perfect, predictors of investment default. Full regard will therefore be given to other available information on the credit quality of the organisations in which it invests, including credit default swap prices, financial statements, information on potential government support, reports in the quality financial press and analysis and advice from the Authority’s treasury management adviser. No investments will be made with an organisation if officers working on treasury management issues have substantive doubts about its credit quality, even though it may otherwise meet the above criteria.

When deteriorating financial market conditions affect the creditworthiness of all organisations, as happened in 2008 and 2020, this is not generally reflected in credit ratings, but can be seen in other market measures. In these circumstances, the Authority will restrict its investments to those organisations of higher credit quality and reduce the maximum duration of its investments to maintain the required level of security. The extent of these restrictions will be in line with prevailing financial market conditions. If these restrictions mean that insufficient commercial organisations of high credit quality are available to invest the Authority’s cash balances, then the surplus will be deposited with the UK Government via the Debt Management Office or invested in government treasury bills for example, or with other local authorities. This will cause a reduction in the level of investment income earned, but will protect the principal sum invested.

**Investment Limits:** The Authority has revenue reserves, which could be used to cover investment losses which were £151.5m on 1<sup>st</sup> April 2021 although not all of these are available. In order that no more than 50% of reserves (as recommended by the code) will be put at risk in the case of a single default, the maximum that will be lent to any one organisation (other than the UK Government) will be £15 million, which is clearly well within the limit. A group of banks under the same ownership or a group of funds under the same management will be treated as a single organisation for limit purposes.

Limits, of £15 million, will also be placed on investments in brokers’ nominee accounts (e.g. King & Shaxson), foreign countries and industry sectors. Investments in pooled funds and multilateral development banks do not count against the limit for any single foreign country, since the risk is diversified over many countries.

**Approved Instruments:** The Authority may lend or invest money using any of the following instruments:

- interest-bearing bank accounts
- fixed term deposits and loans
- callable deposits and loans where the borrower may repay before maturity, but subject to a maximum of £5 million in total

- certificates of deposit
- bonds, notes, bills, commercial paper and other marketable instruments, and shares in money market funds and other pooled funds,

Investments may be made at either a fixed rate of interest, or at a variable rate linked to a market interest rate, such as SONIA, subject to the limits on interest rate exposures below.

**Liquidity management:** The Authority uses cash flow forecasting to determine the maximum period for which funds may prudently be committed. The forecast is compiled on a prudent basis, to minimise the risk of the Authority being forced to borrow on unfavourable terms to meet its financial commitments. Limits on long-term investments are set by reference to the Authority's medium term financial plan and cash flow forecast.

### 5.3 Investments that are not part of Treasury Management Activity

The definition of Treasury Management Activity includes all the investments of the Council. This may include investment activity which is outside the purpose of normal treasury management. Public sector organisations may have investments for various purposes –

- **Investments for treasury management purposes** – are those investments that arise from the organisations cash flows or treasury risk management activity and ultimately represent balances which need to be invested until the cash is required for use in the course of business.
- **Investments for service purposes** – are taken or held primarily for the provision and for the purpose of delivering public services (including housing, regeneration and local infrastructure) or in support of joint working with others to deliver such services.
- **Investments for commercial purposes** – are long term investments taken or held primarily for financial return and are not linked to treasury management activity or directly part of delivering services.

Investments for both services purposes and commercial purposes are covered in greater detail in the Investment Strategy Report / Capital Strategy Report which will be presented to Cabinet on 17<sup>th</sup> February 2022 and then Full Council on 3<sup>rd</sup> March 2022.

### 5.4 Ethical Investments

The Council will not knowingly directly invest in organisations whose activities include practices which directly pose a risk of serious harm to individuals or groups, or whose activities are inconsistent with the mission and values of the Council. At the same time the Council will take full responsibility for proper management of risk and safeguarding its investments by ensuring that they are diversified and made with organisations suitably credit assessed.

The Council's lending activity will be subject to (in order of rank)

- the assessment of meeting the minimum lending criteria as specified in the current Treasury Management Strategy and the minimum credit ratings as outlined in the Strategy.
- meeting the Security, Liquidity & Yield (SLY) criteria as set out in the current Treasury Management Strategy, and
- investments are not contrary to the values outlined in the Ethical Investment Framework (Appendix H)

## 5.5 Related Matters

**Financial derivatives:** Local authorities have previously made use of financial derivatives embedded into loans and investments both to reduce interest rate risk (e.g. interest rate collars and forward deals) and to reduce costs or increase income at the expense of greater risk (e.g. LOBO loans and callable deposits). The general power of competence in Section 1 of the Localism Act 2011 removes much of the uncertainty over local authorities' use of standalone financial derivatives (i.e. those that are not embedded into a loan or investment).

The Authority will only use standalone financial derivatives (such as swaps, forwards, futures and options) where they can be clearly demonstrated to reduce the overall level of the financial risks that the Authority is exposed to. Additional risks presented, such as credit exposure to derivative counterparties, will be taken into account when determining the overall level of risk. Embedded derivatives will not be subject to this policy, although the risks they present will be managed in line with the overall treasury risk management strategy.

Financial derivative transactions may be arranged with any organisation that meets the approved investment criteria. The current value of any amount due from a derivative counterparty will count against the counterparty credit limit and the relevant foreign country limit.

In line with CIPFA Code, the Authority will seek external advice and will consider that the advice before entering into financial derivatives to ensure that it fully understands the implications.

**Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MIFID):** The Authority has opted up to professional client status with its providers of financial services, including advisers, banks, brokers and fund managers, allowing it access to a greater range of services but with the greater regulatory protections afforded to individuals and small companies. Given the size and range of the Authority's treasury management activities, the Chief Financial Officer believes this to be the most appropriate status.

## 5.6 Financial Implications

The budget for investment income in 2022/23 is £0.02m, based on an average investment portfolio of £31.25m at an interest rate of 0.06%. The budget for debt interest paid in 2022/23 is £9.674m, based on an average debt portfolio of £348.9m at an average interest rate of 2.76%. If actual levels of investments and borrowing, or actual interest rates, differ from those forecast, performance against budget will be correspondingly different. Such differences will be reported through regular financial monitoring to Cabinet.

## 5.7 **Balanced Budget Requirement**

The Authority complies with the provisions of S32 of the Local Government Finance Act 1992 to set a balanced budget.

## 6.0 **2022/23 MRP STATEMENT**

6.1 The Local Authorities (Capital Finance and Accounting) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 08 (SI 08/414) place a duty on local authorities to make a prudent provision for debt redemption. Guidance on Minimum Revenue Provision has been issued by the Secretary of State and local authorities are required to “have regard” to such Guidance under section 21(1A) of the Local Government Act 2003.

The four MRP options available are:

Option 1: Regulatory Method

Option 2: CFR Method

Option 3: Asset Life Method

Option 4: Depreciation Method

NB This does not preclude other prudent methods.

MRP in 2021/22: Options 1 and 2 may be used only for supported expenditure. Methods of making prudent provision for self-financed expenditure include Options 3 and 4 (which may also be used for supported expenditure if the Council chooses).

The MRP Statement will be submitted to Council before the start of the 2021/22 financial year. If it is ever proposed to vary the terms of the original MRP Statement during the year, a revised statement should be put to Council at that time.

The Council will calculate MRP by the following methods –

Historic MRP (re pre 2007/08 borrowing). This will be calculated by dividing the balance at 31/3/07 (calculated in accordance with regulations) by 50 for an annual charge that charges over a finite period rather than a 4% reducing balance. Broadly in line with option 3.

MRP in respect of prudential borrowing, government supported allocations since 2007/08 and PFI will be charged over the life of the asset on an annuity basis (option 3 in the regulations).

MRP for borrowing in respect of NuPlace is set at £0 due the expectation that the value will appreciate over time and that the houses could all eventually be sold in which case the Council would apply the capital receipts arising to reduce the Capital Financing Requirement until the original principal borrowed had been fully repaid.

Along the same lines as NuPlace, MRP for borrowing in respect of the Council's Property Investment Portfolio will be calculated as 20% of the value of the annuity MRP to reflect that although there will normally be capital appreciation, although a downturn in the economy could result in reductions in value of commercial/industrial investment properties.

In November 2021 the Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) launched a consultation seeking views on proposed changes to regulations to better enforce the duty of local authorities to make prudent Minimum Revenue Provision each year. The consultation close in February 2022 and the proposals for change relate to the exclusion of a proportion of debt from the MRP calculation, particularly relating to investment assets, capital loans and some operational assets. If approved without amendment, the proposed changes will take effect from the 2023/24 financial year and the Council will prepare the budget for 2023/24 and later years on the revised basis.

MRP in respect of leases brought on Balance Sheet under the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) based Accounting Code of Practice will match the annual principal repayment for the associated deferred liability which is broadly in line with the life of the asset.

Capital expenditure incurred during 2022/23 will not be subject to a MRP charge until 2023/24.

## **7. OTHER ITEMS**

### **7.1 Monitoring and Reporting on the Treasury Outturn and Prudential Indicators**

The Director: Finance & Human Resources will report to the Audit Committee on treasury management activity / performance and Performance Indicators as follows -

- Half yearly against the strategy approved for the year. The authority will produce an outturn report on its treasury activity no later than 31<sup>st</sup> July after the financial year end and an update report alongside the Treasury Strategy in the last quarter of the financial year.

Audit Committee will be responsible of the scrutiny of treasury management activity and practices.

A detailed list of the Treasury Management Section of Delegation and the Treasury Management Role of the Section 151 Officer are included at Appendix G.

### **7.2 Training**

CIPFA's Code of Practice requires the responsible officer to ensure that all members tasked with treasury management responsibilities, including scrutiny of the treasury management function, receive appropriate training relevant to their needs and understand fully their roles and responsibilities.

The authority regularly reviews the training needs of its staff involved with treasury management and ensures that staff are appropriately trained.

### **7.3 Investment Consultants / Treasury Advisors**

The Council's contract for Treasury Advisor services ended on 31 December 2021 and following a procurement process Link Treasury Services Limited were appointed as

Treasury Advisors for the 3 years commencing January 2022. Link currently provide treasury advisory services to over 400 public sector clients in the UK and are experienced and well-resourced to support our treasury function.

The Council recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times.

## **8. BACKGROUND PAPERS**

CIPFA Code of Practice for Treasury Management in Local Authorities

CIPFA Prudential Code

Temporary Borrowing Records

PWLB records

Investment records

Template Treasury Management Strategy provided by Link Treasury Services

Local Government Act 2003

CLG Guidance on Local Authority Investments

Audit Commission – Risk and Return

### **Report prepared by**

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## **TREASURY MANAGEMENT POLICY STATEMENT**

### **1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND**

- 1.1 The Council adopts the key recommendations of CIPFA's Treasury Management in the Public Services: Code of Practice (the TM Code), as described in Section 5 of the TM Code.
- 1.2 Accordingly, the Council will create and maintain, as the cornerstones for effective treasury management:-
  - A treasury management policy statement, stating the policies, objectives and approach to risk management of its treasury management activities
  - Suitable treasury management practices (TMPs), setting out the manner in which the Council will seek to achieve those policies and objectives, and prescribing how it will manage and control those activities.
  - Investment management practices (IMPs) for investments that are not for treasury management purposes.
- 1.3 The Council will receive reports on its treasury management policies, practices and activities including, as a minimum, an annual strategy and plan in advance of the year, a mid-year review and an annual report after its close, in the form prescribed in its TMPs.
- 1.4 The Council delegates responsibility for the implementation and monitoring of its treasury management policies and practices to Audit Committee and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions to Director: Finance & Human Resources, who will act in accordance with the organisation's policy statement and TMPs and CIPFA's Standard of Professional Practice on Treasury Management.
- 1.5 The Council nominates Audit Committee to be responsible for ensuring effective scrutiny of the treasury management strategy and policies.

### **2. POLICIES AND OBJECTIVES OF TREASURY MANAGEMENT ACTIVITIES**

- 2.1 The Council defines its treasury management activities as:

“The management of the Council's investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”

This Council regards the successful identification, monitoring and control of risk to be the prime criteria by which the effectiveness of its treasury management activities will be measured. Accordingly, the analysis and reporting of treasury management activities will focus on their risk implications for the organisation, and any financial instruments entered into to manage these risks.

This Council acknowledges that effective treasury management will provide support towards the achievement of its business and service objectives. It is therefore committed to the principles of achieving value for money in treasury management, and

to employing suitable performance measurement techniques, within the context of effective risk management.”

- 2.2 The Council’s borrowing will be affordable, sustainable and prudent and consideration will be given to the management of interest rate risk and refinancing risk. The source from which the borrowing is taken and the type of borrowing should allow the Council transparency and control over its debt. The Council will look to minimise borrowing through the use of maturing investments to fund capital expenditure rather than reinvestment.
- 2.3 The Council’s primary objective in relation to investments remains the security of capital. The liquidity or accessibility of the Authority’s investments followed by the yield earned on investments remain important but are secondary considerations. Generally as investments mature they will not be reinvested but be used to minimise borrowing.

## EXISTING PORTFOLIO PROJECTED FORWARD

	Current Portfolio £m	%	31/03/22 Estimate £m	31/03/23 Estimate £m	31/03/24 Estimate £m	31/03/25 Estimate £m	31/03/26 Estimate £m
<b>External Borrowing:</b>							
Fixed Rate – PWLB	182.7	60.9	181.6	266.7	340.4	357.0	357.0
Fixed Rate – LOBO	25.0	8.3	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0	25.0
Fixed Rate – Market	15.0	5.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0
Variable Rate – Market	26.0	8.7	79.8	95.0	95.0	95.0	95.0
<b>Total External Borrowing</b>	<b>248.7</b>	<b>82.9</b>	<b>301.4</b>	<b>401.7</b>	<b>475.4</b>	<b>492.0</b>	<b>492.0</b>
<b>IFRS Long Term Liabilities:</b>							
PFI	50.6	16.9	50.6	47.7	44.5	41.1	38.4
Finance Leases	0.7	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0
<b>Total IFRS Long Term Liabilities</b>	<b>51.3</b>	<b>17.1</b>	<b>51.2</b>	<b>48.0</b>	<b>44.7</b>	<b>41.2</b>	<b>38.4</b>
<b>Total Gross External Debt</b>	<b>300.0</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>352.6</b>	<b>449.6</b>	<b>520.1</b>	<b>533.2</b>	<b>530.4</b>
<b>Investments:</b>							
Short-term monies (Deposits / monies on call / MMFs)	22.5	100.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0	15.0
<b>Total Investments</b>	<b>22.5</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>15.0</b>	<b>15.0</b>
<b>(Net Borrowing Position) / Net Investment Position</b>							
<b>Net Borrowing</b>	<b>(277.5)</b>		<b>(337.6)</b>	<b>(434.6)</b>	<b>(505.1)</b>	<b>(518.2)</b>	<b>(515.4)</b>

## Treasury Management Prudential Indicators 2021/22 to 2025/26

### 1 Background:

There is a requirement under the Local Government Act 2003 for local authorities to have regard to CIPFA's Prudential Code for Capital Finance in Local Authorities (the "CIPFA Prudential Code") when setting and reviewing their Prudential Indicators.

The Authority measures and manages its exposure to treasury management risks using the following indicators.

### 2. Security:

The Council considers security, liquidity and yield, in that order, when making investment decisions.

Credit ratings remain an important element of assessing credit risk, but they are not a sole feature in the Council's assessment of counterparty credit risk.

The Council has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to credit risk by monitoring the value-weighted credit score of its investment portfolio. This is calculated by applying a score to each investment (AAA=1, AA+=2, etc.) and taking the arithmetic average, weighted by the size of each investment. Unrated investments would be assigned a score based on their perceived risk.

Credit Risk Indicator	Target
Portfolio average credit score	6 or lower, (which is equivalent to a credit rating of 'A' or higher)

### 3. Liquidity:

The Authority monitors cash flow on an on going basis and is able to anticipate when funds needs to be borrowed in order to ensure that sufficient funds are available to meet its liabilities when they fall due. The Authority has adopted a voluntary measure of its exposure to liquidity risk by monitoring the amount it can borrow each quarter without giving prior notice.

Liquidity Risk Indicator	Target
Total sum borrowed in past 3 months without prior notice	£40.0m

### 4. Interest Rate Exposure:

Within the Medium Term Financial Strategy 2022/23 – 2025/26, a prudent interest rate of 2.5% has been assumed for all future borrowing. This indicator is set to control the Authority's exposure to interest rate risk. The upper limits on the one year revenue impact of a rise of 1% rise in interest rate will be:

<b>Interest Rate Risk Indicator</b>	<b>Limit</b>
Upper limit on one year revenue impact of a 1% rise in interest rates	£0.964m

**5. Maturity Structure of Fixed Rate borrowing:**

This indicator highlights the existence of any large concentrations of fixed rate debt needing to be replaced at times of uncertainty over interest rates and is designed to protect against excessive exposures to interest rate changes in any one period, in particular in the course of the next ten years.

It is calculated as the amount of projected borrowing that is fixed rate maturing in each period as a percentage of total projected borrowing that is fixed rate. The maturity of borrowing is determined by reference to the earliest date on which the lender can require payment. For loans with Lender Options / Borrower Options (LOBOs) this is assumed as the final maturity date.

<b>Maturity structure of fixed rate borrowing</b>	<b>Existing level 31.12.21 %</b>	<b>Lower Limit for 22/23 %</b>	<b>Upper Limit for 22/23 %</b>
under 12 months	10	0	70
12 months and within 24 months	3	0	30
24 months and within 5 years	16	0	50
5 years and within 10 years	14	0	75
10 years and within 20 years	13	0	75
20 years and within 30 years	0	0	75
30 years and within 40 years	11	0	100
40 years and within 50 years	24	0	100
50 years and above	9	0	100

**6. Principal sums invested for periods longer than a year:**

The purpose of this indicator is to control the Authority's exposure to the risk of incurring losses by seeking early repayment of its investments. The limits on the long-term principal sum invested to final maturities beyond the period end will be:

	<b>22/23 Estimate %</b>	<b>23/24 Estimate %</b>	<b>24/25 Estimate %</b>
Limit on principal invested beyond year end	<b>95</b>	<b>95</b>	<b>95</b>

## **Link Treasury Services Economic Background & Interest Rate Forecast December 2021**

### **COVID-19 vaccines**

These were the game changer during 2021 which raised high hopes that life in the UK would be able to largely return to normal in the second half of the year. However, the bursting onto the scene of the Omicron mutation at the end of November, rendered the initial two doses of all vaccines largely ineffective in preventing infection. This has dashed such hopes and raises the spectre again that a fourth wave of the virus could overwhelm hospitals in early 2022. What we now know is that this mutation is very fast spreading with the potential for total case numbers to double every two to three days, although it possibly may not cause so much severe illness as previous mutations. Rather than go for full lockdowns which heavily damage the economy, the government strategy this time is focusing on getting as many people as possible to have a third (booster) vaccination after three months from the previous last injection, as a booster has been shown to restore a high percentage of immunity to Omicron to those who have had two vaccinations. There is now a race on between how quickly boosters can be given to limit the spread of Omicron, and how quickly will hospitals fill up and potentially be unable to cope. In the meantime, workers have been requested to work from home and restrictions have been placed on large indoor gatherings and hospitality venues. With the household saving rate having been exceptionally high since the first lockdown in March 2020, there is plenty of pent-up demand and purchasing power stored up for services in sectors like restaurants, travel, tourism and hotels which had been hit hard during 2021, but could now be hit hard again by either, or both, of government restrictions and/or consumer reluctance to leave home. Growth will also be lower due to people being ill and not working, similar to the pingdemic in July. The economy, therefore, faces significant headwinds although some sectors have learned how to cope well with COVID. However, the biggest impact on growth would come from another lockdown if that happened. The big question still remains as to whether any further mutations of this virus could develop which render all current vaccines ineffective, as opposed to how quickly vaccines can be modified to deal with them and enhanced testing programmes be implemented to contain their spread until tweaked vaccines become widely available.

### **A SUMMARY OVERVIEW OF THE FUTURE PATH OF BANK RATE**

- In December, the Bank of England became the first major western central bank to put interest rates up in this upswing in the current business cycle in western economies as recovery progresses from the COVID recession of 2020.
- The next increase in Bank Rate could be in February or May, dependent on how severe an impact there is from Omicron.
- If there are lockdowns in January, this could pose a barrier for the MPC to putting Bank Rate up again as early as 3<sup>rd</sup> February.
- With inflation expected to peak at around 6% in April, the MPC may want to be seen to be active in taking action to counter inflation on 5<sup>th</sup> May, the release date for its Quarterly Monetary Policy Report.

- The December 2021 MPC meeting was more concerned with combating inflation over the medium term than supporting economic growth in the short term.
- Bank Rate increases beyond May are difficult to forecast as inflation is likely to drop sharply in the second half of 2022.
- However, the MPC will want to normalise Bank Rate over the next three years so that it has its main monetary policy tool ready to use in time for the next down-turn; all rates under 2% are providing stimulus to economic growth.
- We have put year end 0.25% increases into Q1 of each financial year from 2023 to recognise this upward bias in Bank Rate - but the actual timing in each year is difficult to predict.
- COVID remains a major potential downside threat in all three years as we ARE likely to get further mutations.
- How quickly can science come up with a mutation proof vaccine, or other treatment, – and for them to be widely administered around the world?
- Purchases of gilts under QE ended in December. Note that when Bank Rate reaches 0.50%, the MPC has said it will start running down its stock of QE.

### **MPC MEETING 16<sup>H</sup> DECEMBER 2021**

- The Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) voted 8-1 to raise Bank Rate by 0.15% from 0.10% to 0.25% and unanimously decided to make no changes to its programme of quantitative easing purchases due to finish in December 2021 at a total of £895bn.
- The MPC disappointed financial markets by not raising Bank Rate at its November meeting. Until Omicron burst on the scene, most forecasters, therefore, viewed a Bank Rate increase as being near certain at this December meeting due to the way that inflationary pressures have been comprehensively building in both producer and consumer prices, and in wage rates. However, at the November meeting, the MPC decided it wanted to have assurance that the labour market would get over the end of the furlough scheme on 30<sup>th</sup> September without unemployment increasing sharply; their decision was, therefore, to wait until statistics were available to show how the economy had fared at this time.

### **OTHER UK**

On 10<sup>th</sup> December we learnt of the disappointing 0.1% m/m rise in GDP in October which suggested that economic growth had already slowed to a crawl even before the Omicron variant was discovered in late November. Early evidence suggests growth in November might have been marginally better. Nonetheless, at such low rates of growth, the government's "Plan B" COVID-19 restrictions could cause the economy to contract in December.

On 14<sup>th</sup> December, the labour market statistics for the three months to October and the single month of October were released. The fallout after the furlough scheme was smaller and shorter than the Bank of England had feared. The single-month data were more informative and showed that LFS employment fell by 240,000, unemployment increased by 75,000 and the unemployment rate rose from 3.9% in September to 4.2%. However, the weekly data suggested this didn't last long as unemployment was

falling again by the end of October. What's more, the 49,700 fall in the claimant count and the 257,000 rise in the PAYE measure of company payrolls suggests that the labour market strengthened again in November. The other side of the coin was a further rise in the number of vacancies from 1.182m to a record 1.219m in the three months to November which suggests that the supply of labour is struggling to keep up with demand, although the single-month figure for November fell for the first time since February, from 1.307m to 1.227m.

These figures by themselves, would probably have been enough to give the MPC the assurance that it could press ahead to raise Bank Rate at this December meeting. However, the advent of Omicron potentially threw a spanner into the works as it poses a major headwind to the economy which, of itself, will help to cool the economy. The financial markets, therefore, swung round to expecting no change in Bank Rate.

On 15th December we had the CPI inflation figure for November which spiked up further from 4.2% to 5.1%, confirming again how inflationary pressures have been building sharply. However, Omicron also caused a sharp fall in world oil and other commodity prices; (gas and electricity inflation has generally accounted on average for about 60% of the increase in inflation in advanced western economies).

Other elements of inflation are also transitory e.g., prices of goods being forced up by supply shortages, and shortages of shipping containers due to ports being clogged have caused huge increases in shipping costs. But these issues are likely to clear during 2022, and then prices will subside back to more normal levels. Gas prices and electricity prices will also fall back once winter is passed and demand for these falls away.

Although it is possible that the Government could step in with some fiscal support for the economy, the huge cost of such support to date is likely to pose a barrier to incurring further major economy wide expenditure unless it is very limited and targeted on narrow sectors like hospitality, (as announced just before Christmas). The Government may well, therefore, effectively leave it to the MPC, and to monetary policy, to support economic growth – but at a time when the threat posed by rising inflation is near to peaking!

This is the adverse set of factors against which the MPC had to decide on Bank Rate. For the second month in a row, the MPC blind-sided financial markets, this time with a surprise increase in Bank Rate from 0.10% to 0.25%. What's more, the hawkish tone of comments indicated that the MPC is now concerned that inflationary pressures are indeed building and need concerted action by the MPC to counter. This indicates that there will be more increases to come with financial markets predicting 1% by the end of 2022. The 8-1 vote to raise the rate shows that there is firm agreement that inflation now poses a threat, especially after the CPI figure hit a 10-year high this week. The MPC commented that “there has been significant upside news” and that “there were some signs of greater persistence in domestic costs and price pressures”.

On the other hand, it did also comment that “the Omicron variant is likely to weigh on near-term activity”. But it stressed that at the November meeting it had said it would raise rates if the economy evolved as it expected and that now “these conditions had been met”. It also appeared more worried about the possible boost to inflation from Omicron itself. It said that “the current position of the global and UK economies was materially different compared with prior to the onset of the pandemic, including

elevated levels of consumer price inflation". It also noted the possibility that renewed social distancing would boost demand for goods again, (as demand for services would fall), meaning "global price pressures might persist for longer". (Recent news is that the largest port in the world in China has come down with an Omicron outbreak which is not only affecting the port but also factories in the region.)

On top of that, there were no references this month to inflation being expected to be below the 2% target in two years' time, which at November's meeting the MPC referenced to suggest the markets had gone too far in expecting interest rates to rise to over 1.00% by the end of the year.

These comments indicate that there has been a material reappraisal by the MPC of the inflationary pressures since their last meeting and the Bank also increased its forecast for inflation to peak at 6% next April, rather than at 5% as of a month ago. However, as the Bank retained its guidance that only a "modest tightening" in policy will be required, it cannot be thinking that it will need to increase interest rates that much more. A typical policy tightening cycle has usually involved rates rising by 0.25% four times in a year. "Modest" seems slower than that. As such, the Bank could be thinking about raising interest rates two or three times next year to 0.75% or 1.00%.

In as much as a considerable part of the inflationary pressures at the current time are indeed transitory, and will naturally subside, and since economic growth is likely to be weak over the next few months, this would appear to indicate that this tightening cycle is likely to be comparatively short.

As for the timing of the next increase in Bank Rate, the MPC dropped the comment from November's statement that Bank Rate would be raised "in the coming months". That may imply another rise is unlikely at the next meeting in February and that May is more likely. However, much could depend on how adversely, or not, the economy is affected by Omicron in the run up to the next meeting on 3<sup>rd</sup> February. Once 0.50% is reached, the Bank would act to start shrinking its stock of QE, (gilts purchased by the Bank would not be replaced when they mature).

The MPC's forward guidance on its intended monetary policy on raising Bank Rate versus selling (quantitative easing) holdings of bonds is as follows: -

- Raising Bank Rate as "the active instrument in most circumstances".
- Raising Bank Rate to 0.50% before starting on reducing its holdings.
- Once Bank Rate is at 0.50% it would stop reinvesting maturing gilts.
- Once Bank Rate had risen to at least 1%, it would start selling its holdings.

## **US**

Shortages of goods and intermediate goods like semi-conductors, have been fuelling increases in prices and reducing economic growth potential. In November, CPI inflation hit a near 40-year record level of 6.8% but with energy prices then falling sharply, this is probably the peak. The biggest problem for the Fed is the mounting evidence of a strong pick-up in cyclical price pressures e.g., in rent which has hit a decades high.

Shortages of labour have also been driving up wage rates sharply; this also poses a considerable threat to feeding back into producer prices and then into consumer prices inflation. It now also appears that there has been a sustained drop in the labour force which suggests the pandemic has had a longer-term scarring effect in reducing

potential GDP. Economic growth may therefore be reduced to between 2 and 3% in 2022 and 2023 while core inflation is likely to remain elevated at around 3% in both years instead of declining back to the Fed's 2% central target.

Inflation hitting 6.8% and the feed through into second round effects, meant that it was near certain that the Fed's meeting of 15<sup>th</sup> December would take aggressive action against inflation. Accordingly, the rate of tapering of monthly \$120bn QE purchases announced at its November 3<sup>rd</sup> meeting was doubled so that all purchases would now finish in February 2022. In addition, Fed officials had started discussions on running down the stock of QE held by the Fed. Fed officials also expected three rate rises in 2022 of 0.25% from near zero currently, followed by three in 2023 and two in 2024, taking rates back above 2% to a neutral level for monetary policy. The first increase could come as soon as March 2022 as the chairman of the Fed stated his view that the economy had made rapid progress to achieving the other goal of the Fed – "maximum employment". The Fed forecast that inflation would fall from an average of 5.3% in 2021 to 2.6% in 2023, still above its target of 2% and both figures significantly up from previous forecasts. What was also significant was that this month the Fed dropped its description of the current level of inflation as being "transitory" and instead referred to "elevated levels" of inflation: the statement also dropped most of the language around the flexible average inflation target, with inflation now described as having exceeded 2 percent "for some time". It did not see Omicron as being a major impediment to the need to take action now to curtail the level of inflationary pressures that have built up, although Fed officials did note that it has the potential to exacerbate supply chain problems and add to price pressures.

*See also comments in paragraph 3.3 under PWLB rates and gilt yields.*

## **EU**

The slow roll out of vaccines initially delayed economic recovery in early 2021 but the vaccination rate then picked up sharply. After a contraction of -0.3% in Q1, Q2 came in with strong growth of 2%. With Q3 at 2.2%, the EU recovery was then within 0.5% of its pre COVID size. However, the arrival of Omicron is now a major headwind to growth in quarter 4 and the expected downturn into weak growth could well turn negative, with the outlook for the first two months of 2022 expected to continue to be very weak.

November's inflation figures breakdown shows that the increase in price pressures is not just due to high energy costs and global demand-supply imbalances for durable goods as services inflation also rose. Headline inflation reached 4.9% in November, with over half of that due to energy. However, oil and gas prices are expected to fall after the winter and so energy inflation is expected to plummet in 2022. Core goods inflation rose to 2.4% in November, its second highest ever level, and is likely to remain high for some time as it will take a long time for the inflationary impact of global imbalances in the demand and supply of durable goods to disappear. Price pressures also increased in the services sector, but wage growth remains subdued and there are no signs of a trend of faster wage growth which might lead to *persistently* higher services inflation - which would get the ECB concerned. The upshot is that the euro-zone is set for a prolonged period of inflation being above the ECB's target of 2% and it is likely to average 3% in 2022, in line with the ECB's latest projection.

The ECB has joined with the Fed by also announcing at its meeting on 16th December that it will be reducing its QE purchases - by half from October 2022, i.e., it will still be providing significant stimulus via QE purchases for over half of next year. However, as inflation will fall back sharply during 2022, it is likely that it will leave its central rate below zero, (currently -0.50%), over the next two years. The main struggle that the ECB has had in recent years is that inflation has been doggedly anaemic in sticking below the ECB's target rate despite all its major programmes of monetary easing by cutting rates into negative territory and providing QE support.

The ECB will now also need to consider the impact of Omicron on the economy, and it stated at its December meeting that it is prepared to provide further QE support if the pandemic causes bond yield spreads of peripheral countries, (compared to the yields of northern EU countries), to rise. However, that is the only reason it will support peripheral yields, so this support is limited in its scope.

The EU has entered into a period of political uncertainty where a new German government formed of a coalition of three parties with Olaf Scholz replacing Angela Merkel as Chancellor in December 2021, will need to find its feet both within the EU and in the three parties successfully working together. In France there is a presidential election coming up in April 2022 followed by the legislative election in June. In addition, Italy needs to elect a new president in January with Prime Minister Draghi being a favourite due to having suitable gravitas for this post. However, if he switched office, there is a significant risk that the current government coalition could collapse. That could then cause differentials between Italian and German bonds to widen when 2022 will also see a gradual running down of ECB support for the bonds of weaker countries within the EU. These political uncertainties could have repercussions on economies and on Brexit issues.

## **CHINA**

After a concerted effort to get on top of the virus outbreak in Q1 2020, economic recovery was strong in the rest of 2020; this enabled China to recover all the initial contraction. During 2020, policy makers both quashed the virus and implemented a programme of monetary and fiscal support that was particularly effective at stimulating short-term growth. At the same time, China's economy benefited from the shift towards online spending by consumers in developed markets. These factors helped to explain its comparative outperformance compared to western economies during 2020 and earlier in 2021.

However, the pace of economic growth has now fallen back in 2021 after this initial surge of recovery from the pandemic and looks likely to be particularly weak in 2022. China has been struggling to contain the spread of the Delta variant through using sharp local lockdowns - which depress economic growth. Chinese consumers are also being very wary about leaving home and so spending money on services. However, with Omicron having now spread to China, and being much more easily transmissible, this strategy of sharp local lockdowns to stop the virus may not prove so successful in future. In addition, the current pace of providing boosters at 100 billion per month will leave much of the 1.4 billion population exposed to Omicron, and any further mutations, for a considerable time. The People's Bank of China made a start in December 2021 on cutting its key interest rate marginally so as to stimulate economic growth. However, after credit has already expanded by around 25% in just the last two

years, it will probably leave the heavy lifting in supporting growth to fiscal stimulus by central and local government.

Supply shortages, especially of coal for power generation, were causing widespread power cuts to industry during the second half of 2021 and so a sharp disruptive impact on some sectors of the economy. In addition, recent regulatory actions motivated by a political agenda to channel activities into officially approved directions, are also likely to reduce the dynamism and long-term growth of the Chinese economy.

## **JAPAN**

2021 has been a patchy year in combating COVID. However, recent business surveys indicate that the economy has been rebounding rapidly in 2021 once the bulk of the population had been double vaccinated and new virus cases had plunged. However, Omicron could reverse this initial success in combating COVID.

The Bank of Japan is continuing its very loose monetary policy but with little prospect of getting inflation back above 1% towards its target of 2%, any time soon: indeed, inflation was actually negative in July. New Prime Minister Kishida, having won the November general election, brought in a supplementary budget to boost growth, but it is unlikely to have a major effect.

## **WORLD GROWTH**

World growth was in recession in 2020 but recovered during 2021 until starting to lose momentum in the second half of the year, though overall growth for the year is expected to be about 6% and to be around 4-5% in 2022. Inflation has been rising due to increases in gas and electricity prices, shipping costs and supply shortages, although these should subside during 2022. While headline inflation will fall sharply, core inflation will probably not fall as quickly as central bankers would hope. It is likely that we are heading into a period where there will be a reversal of world globalisation and a decoupling of western countries from dependence on China to supply products, and vice versa. This is likely to reduce world growth rates from those in prior decades.

## **SUPPLY SHORTAGES**

The pandemic and extreme weather events, followed by a major surge in demand after lockdowns ended, have been highly disruptive of extended worldwide supply chains. Major queues of ships unable to unload their goods at ports in New York, California and China built up rapidly during quarters 2 and 3 of 2021 but then halved during quarter 4. Such issues have led to a misdistribution of shipping containers around the world and have contributed to a huge increase in the cost of shipping. Combined with a shortage of semi-conductors, these issues have had a disruptive impact on production in many countries. The latest additional disruption has been a shortage of coal in China leading to power cuts focused primarily on producers (rather than consumers), i.e., this will further aggravate shortages in meeting demand for goods. Many western countries are also hitting up against a difficulty in filling job vacancies. It is expected that these issues will be gradually sorted out, but they are currently contributing to a spike upwards in inflation and shortages of materials and goods available to purchase.

**Interest Rate Forecasts 2021 – 2025** - PWLB forecasts shown below have taken into account the 20 basis point certainty rate reduction effective as of the 1st November 2012.

Link Group Interest Rate View		20.12.21													
		Dec-21	Mar-22	Jun-22	Sep-22	Dec-22	Mar-23	Jun-23	Sep-23	Dec-23	Mar-24	Jun-24	Sep-24	Dec-24	Mar-25
<b>BANK RATE</b>		0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
3 month ave earnings		0.20	0.30	0.50	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
6 month ave earnings		0.40	0.50	0.60	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10	1.10
12 month ave earnings		0.70	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.80	0.90	1.00	1.10	1.10	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
5 yr PWLB		1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
10 yr PWLB		1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30
25 yr PWLB		1.80	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50
50 yr PWLB		1.50	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30
<b>Bank Rate</b>															
Link		0.25	0.25	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.25
Capital Economics		0.25	0.25	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	1.00	1.00	-	-	-	-	-
<b>5yr PWLB Rate</b>															
Link		1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00
Capital Economics		1.40	1.40	1.50	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.90	-	-	-	-	-
<b>10yr PWLB Rate</b>															
Link		1.60	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30
Capital Economics		1.60	1.60	1.70	1.70	1.80	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.00	-	-	-	-	-
<b>25yr PWLB Rate</b>															
Link		1.80	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30	2.40	2.40	2.50	2.50
Capital Economics		1.80	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.30	-	-	-	-	-
<b>50yr PWLB Rate</b>															
Link		1.50	1.70	1.80	1.90	1.90	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.10	2.10	2.20	2.20	2.30	2.30
Capital Economics		1.40	1.50	1.60	1.70	1.80	1.90	2.00	2.20	2.30	-	-	-	-	-

**Recommended Sovereign and Counterparty List (Section 8)**

- **Group Limits** - For institutions within a banking group, the authority executes a limit at the highest of any of the single banks within that group.
- **Sovereign Limit** – The Council will only invest a maximum of £15m of the portfolio with non UK sovereigns.

<b>Instrument</b>	<b>Country/ Domicile</b>	<b>Counterparty</b>	<b>Maximum Counterparty Limit  £m</b>	<b>Maximum Group Limit (if applicable)  £m</b>	<b>Council Holding at 31/12/21  £m</b>
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	Santander UK Plc (Banco Santander Group)	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	Bank of Scotland (Lloyds Banking Group)	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	Lloyds (Lloyds Banking Group)	15	15	6.8
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	Barclays Bank Plc	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	HSBC Bank Plc	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	Nationwide Building Society	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	NatWest (RBS Group)	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS Group)	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	Standard Chartered Bank	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	Close Brothers Limited	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	Goldman Sachs International Bank	15	15	0

<b>Instrument</b>	<b>Country/ Domicile</b>	<b>Counterparty</b>	<b>Maximum Counterparty Limit  £m</b>	<b>Maximum Group Limit (if applicable)  £m</b>	<b>Council Holding at 31/12/21  £m</b>
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	UK	Leeds Building Society	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Australia	Australia and NZ Banking Group	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Australia	Commonwealth Bank of Australia	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Australia	National Australia Bank Ltd (National Australia Bank Group)	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Australia	Westpac Banking Corp	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Canada	Bank of Montreal	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Canada	Bank of Nova Scotia	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Canada	Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Canada	Royal Bank of Canada	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Canada	Toronto- Dominion Bank	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Finland	Nordea Bank Finland	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Finland	Pohjola Bank	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Germany	Deutsche Bank AG	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Germany	Landesbank Hessen – Thuringen (Helaba)	15	15	0

<b>Instrument</b>	<b>Country/ Domicile</b>	<b>Counterparty</b>	<b>Maximum Counterparty Limit  £m</b>	<b>Maximum Group Limit (if applicable)  £m</b>	<b>Council Holding at 31/12/21  £m</b>
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Netherlands	ING Bank NV	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Netherlands	Rabobank	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Netherlands	Bank Nederlandse Gemeenten	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Singapore	DBS Bank Ltd	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Singapore	Oversea- Chinese Banking Corporation (OCBC)	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Singapore	United Overseas bank (UOB)	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Sweden	Svenska Handelsbanken	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	Switzerland	Credit Suisse	15	15	0
Term Deposits / CDs / Call Accounts	US	JP Morgan Chase Bank	15	15	0

**Summary of Treasury Investments**Total risk per counterparty as at 31 December 2021

	<b>Credit Rating</b>	<b>Total £m</b>
<u>Fixed Deposits</u>		
Lloyds	UK A+	6.785
Debt Management Office	UK Government	10.700
Money Market Funds	AAAm	4.980
<b>Total cash deposits</b>		<b><u>22.465</u></b>

**Credit Risk Rating:** as at 31 December 2021: 2.2  
Average for the year to date: 1.5

**Sovereign Analysis:**

Lloyds Bank 100% UK  
DMO 100% UK  
MMFs 4.38% UK / 95.62% NON-UK

## Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation

### (i) Full Council

- approval of annual strategy and mid year update and annual report, and
- approval of/amendments to the organisations adopted clauses, treasury management policy, treasury management practices, treasury management indicators and prudential indicators

### (ii) Full Council / Cabinet

- budget consideration and approval, and
- receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations,

### (iii) Audit Committee

- reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the responsible body, Full Council.

## The Treasury Management Role of the Section 151 Officer

### The S151 (responsible) officer

- recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance;
- submitting regular treasury management policy reports;
- submitting budgets and budget variations;
- receiving and reviewing management information reports;
- reviewing the performance of the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function;
- ensuring the adequacy of internal audit, and liaising with external audit;
- recommending the appointment of external service providers.

## **Ethical Investment Framework – Telford and Wrekin Council**

At the current time the Council's treasury activity consists principally of making short-dated loans to the UK Government (through the Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility) and to banks and building societies which adheres to the S-L-Y principles of (Security, Liquidity and Yield, in that order).

The preservation of capital is the Council's principal and overriding priority. The banks and building societies on the Council's lending list are selected only if the institutions and the sovereign meet a minimum credit criteria. In accordance with its social and corporate governance responsibilities, the Council seeks to support institutions which additionally have an ethical and responsible approach to environmental and social issues including employment and global trade. These "ethical" criteria and their basis are described below.

### **1. Environmental and Social Standards**

#### Equator Principles

The Equator Principles (EPs) are a voluntary set of guidelines based on the environmental and social standards practiced by the International Finance Committee when evaluating financing projects. Financial institutions that adopt the Principles agree to use a screening process aiming to ensure that environmental and social assessments help inform decisions to finance development projects. This allows signatories to engage proactively with their stakeholders on environmental and social policy issues.

The EPs are a screening framework for determining, assessing and managing environmental and social risk in project finance transactions for major infrastructure and industrial projects. The EPs are adopted voluntarily by financial institutions and are applied where total project capital costs exceed US\$10 million. The EPs are primarily intended to provide a minimum standard for due diligence to support responsible risk decision-making. They are based on the International Finance Corporation's performance standards on social and environmental sustainability and on the World Bank Group Environmental Health and Safety Guidelines.

Financial institutions which are signatories to the EPs commit to not providing loans to projects where the borrower will not or is unable to comply with their respective social and environmental policies and procedures that implement the EPs.

The following banks relating to institutions on the Council's lending list have adopted the Equator Principles:

- Lloyds Banking Group (parent of Bank of Scotland plc and Lloyds Bank plc)
- Banco Santander (parent of Santander UK plc)
- Svenska Handelsbanken AB (parent of Handelsbanken UK)
- Barclays plc (parent of Barclays Bank)
- HSBC Holding plc (parent of HSBC plc)
- Nat West Group plc
- Royal Bank of Scotland
- Standard Chartered plc
- Australia and New Zealand Banking Group
- Commonwealth Bank Australia
- Westpac Banking Corp.
- Bank of Montreal

- Bank of Nova Scotia
- Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
- Royal Bank of Canada
- Nordea Bank Finland
- Deutsche Bank AG
- ING Bank NV
- Credit Suisse
- JP Morgan Chase Bank

<http://www.equator-principles.com/index.php/members-reporting>

## **2. Human Rights, Labour and Environment**

The **UN Global Compact** is a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption.

Corporations which sign up to the UN Global Compact are encouraged to themselves embrace and in turn, support and enact, within their sphere of influence, a set of core values which are derived from:

- The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
- The International Labour Organization's Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
- The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
- The United Nations Convention Against Corruption

### Human Rights

- Principle 1: Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and
- Principle 2: make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.

### Labour

- Principle 3: Businesses should uphold the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining;
- Principle 4: the elimination of all forms of forced and compulsory labour;
- Principle 5: the effective abolition of child labour; and
- Principle 6: the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.

### Environment

- Principle 7: Businesses should support a precautionary approach to environmental challenges;
- Principle 8: undertake initiatives to promote greater environmental responsibility; and
- Principle 9: encourage the development and diffusion of environmentally friendly technologies.

### Anti-Corruption

- Principle 10: Businesses should work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery.

The following banks relating to institutions on the Council's lending list are participants/stakeholders of the UN Global Compact:

- Lloyds Banking Group
- Svenska Handelsbanken AB
- Gruppo Santander (ultimate parent of Santander UK plc)
- HSBC
- Royal Bank of Scotland
- Standard Chartered
- Nationwide Building Society
- NatWest Group plc
- The Royal Bank of Scotland Group
- Australia and New Zealand Banking Group
- Commonwealth Bank of Australia
- National Australia Bank
- Westpac Banking Corp.
- Nordea Bank AB
- ING Bank NV
- Rabobank Group
- DBS Bank Ltd
- Credit Suisse

<http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeholders/index.html>

#### **Limitations to ethical policies:**

It should be noted here that the individual institutions which have signed up to the Equator Principles and to the Global Compact screen borrowers before lending for infrastructure and industrial projects.

However, financial institutions also engage daily in money market and interbank lending transactions; the criteria for such lending is based primarily on credit risk assessment (i.e. the assessment of their lending being repaid in full and on time when it is due). Being a signatory to the EPs will not necessarily be a critical feature of such credit assessment and the Council is not in a position to monitor interbank lending. The same applies to an individual financial signing up to the UN Global Compact.

It should also be noted that becoming a signatory of voluntary guidelines (Equator Principle or Global Compact) does not guarantee that that institution's policies and practices are of a better standard than those institutions which are not signatories to the voluntary guidelines.

**Activist investment:** The Council does not invest directly in shares traded on the markets or in corporate bonds. Not only are such investments inherently higher risk investments, and requires a distinct and separate set of fund management expertise. Under current legislation (SI 2003 No 3146) the purchase of share capital or loan capital of a body corporate is a capital expenditure investment which, on sale or maturity, becomes a capital receipt and is unsuitable for the Council's treasury investments which are primarily the cash management of its operating surpluses and reserves. Corporate bond and equity investments would however be made by the Council's pension fund (run by Shropshire Council).

Other than through its pension fund (which is measured by Shropshire Council), the Council cannot seek to influence decision making at a company by voicing concerns, engaging in a dialogue with management, or lobbying other shareholders for support. Activist investors attempt to purchase sufficient shares or obtain seats on the board with the goal of effecting major change in the company to make the company more valuable financially or socially (for example to change management policies and adopt better governance; optimise shareholder value through acquisitions/divestitures, be more socially responsible etc).

## Credit Ratings – A Guide.

### *Long-term credit ratings and Sovereign Ratings*

Fitch Rating' long-term credit ratings are set up along a scale from 'AAA' to 'D', first introduced in 1924 and later adopted and licensed by Standard & Poors (S&P). Moody's also uses a similar scale, but names the categories differently. Like S&P, Fitch also uses intermediate modifiers for each category between AA and CCC (i.e., AA+, AA, AA-, A+, A, A-, BBB+, BBB, BBB- etc.).

#### Investment grade

- **AAA** : the best quality, reliable and stable
- **AA** : good quality, a bit higher risk than AAA
- **A** : economic situation can affect finance
- **BBB** : medium class counterparties, which are satisfactory at the moment

#### Non-investment grade

- **BB** : more prone to changes in the economy
- **B** : financial situation varies noticeably
- **CCC** : currently vulnerable and dependent on favourable economic conditions to meet its commitments
- **CC** : highly vulnerable, very speculative bonds
- **C** : highly vulnerable, perhaps in bankruptcy or in arrears but still continuing to pay out on obligations
- **D** : has defaulted on obligations and Fitch believes that it will generally default on most or all obligations
- **NR** : not publicly rated

### *Short-term credit ratings*

Fitch's short-term ratings indicate the potential level of default within a 12-month period.

- **F1+** : best quality grade, indicating exceptionally strong capacity of obligor to meet its financial commitment
- **F1** : best quality grade, indicating strong capacity of obligor to meet its financial commitment
- **F2** : good quality grade with satisfactory capacity of obligor to meet its financial commitment
- **F3** : fair quality grade with adequate capacity of obligor to meet its financial commitment but near term adverse conditions could impact the obligor's commitments
- **B** : of speculative nature and obligor has minimal capacity to meet its commitment and vulnerability to short term adverse changes in financial and economic conditions
- **C** : possibility of default is high and the financial commitment of the obligor are dependent upon sustained, favourable business and economic conditions
- **D** : the obligor is in default as it has failed on its financial commitments.

## **Support Ratings (1 – 5)**

### **The Purpose and Function of Support Ratings**

Support Ratings are Fitch Ratings' assessment of a potential supporter's propensity to support a bank and of its ability to support it. Its propensity to support is a judgment made by Fitch Ratings. Its ability to support is set by the potential supporter's own Issuer Default Ratings, both in foreign currency and, where appropriate, in local currency. Support Ratings do not assess the intrinsic credit quality of a bank. Rather they communicate the agency's judgment on whether the bank would receive support should this become necessary. These ratings are exclusively the expression of Fitch Ratings' opinion even though the principles underlying them may have been discussed with the relevant supervisory authorities and/or owners.

### **Timeliness and Effectiveness Requirements**

Fitch Ratings' Support Rating definitions are predicated on the assumption that any necessary "support" is provided on a timely basis. The definitions are also predicated on the assumption that any necessary support will be sufficiently sustained so that the bank being supported is able to continue meeting its financial commitments until the crisis is over.

### **Obligations and Financial Instruments Covered**

In terms of these definitions, unless otherwise specified, "support" is deemed to be in terms of foreign currency. It is assumed that typically the following obligations will be supported: senior debt (secured and unsecured), including insured and uninsured deposits (retail, wholesale and interbank); obligations arising from derivatives transactions and from legally enforceable guarantees and indemnities, letters of credit, and acceptances; trade receivables and obligations arising from court judgments.

Likewise, the agency does not assume that the following capital instruments will be supported when sovereign support is involved: preference/preferred shares or stock; hybrid capital (tier 1 and upper tier 2), including reserve capital instruments (RCIs) and variations upon RCIs; and common/ordinary equity capital. It is also assumed that there will be no support for any moral obligation on securitizations. The sovereign support status of subordinated debt is difficult to categorize in advance; it is assessed on a case by case basis, distinguishing among different jurisdictions.

### **Definitions:**

- 1:** A bank for which there is an extremely high probability of external support. The potential provider of support is very highly rated in its own right and has a very high propensity to support the bank in question. This probability of support indicates a minimum Long-Term Rating floor of 'A-'.
- 2:** A bank for which there is a high probability of external support. The potential provider of support is highly rated in its own right and has a high propensity to provide support to the bank in question. This probability of support indicates a minimum Long-Term Rating floor of 'BBB-'.
- 3:** A bank for which there is a moderate probability of support because of uncertainties about the ability or propensity of the potential provider of support to do so. This probability of support indicates a minimum Long-Term Rating floor of 'BB-'.

- 4:** A bank for which there is a limited probability of support because of significant uncertainties about the ability or propensity of any possible provider of support to do so. This probability of support indicates a minimum Long-Term Rating floor of 'B'.
- 5:** A bank for which external support, although possible, cannot be relied upon. This may be due to a lack of propensity to provide support or to very weak financial ability to do so. This probability of support indicates a Long-Term Rating floor no higher than 'B-' and in many cases no floor at all.

## GLOSSARY

Term	Meaning
Affordable Borrowing Limit	The amount the authority would normally borrow at any point of time in the year. This boundary might be exceeded temporarily but only in exceptional circumstances. The limit is set by Full Council at the beginning of March and is a prudential indicator.
Annuity	A method of repaying a loan where the cash payment remains constant over the life of the loan, but the proportion in interest reduces and the proportion of principal repayment increases over time.
Authorised Borrowing Limit	The maximum amount the authority can borrow at any point of time in the year. This limit should never be exceeded. The limit is set by Full Council at the beginning of March and is a prudential indicator.
Bail-in	A method of rescuing a failing financial institution by cancelling some of its deposits and bonds. Investors may suffer a haircut but may be given shares in the bank as part compensation. See also bail-out
Bail-out	A method of rescuing a failing financial institution by the injection of public money. This protects investors at the expense of the taxpayer.
Call account	A deposit account that can be called back, normally on instant access.
Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)	This represents the underlying need for the authority to borrow and represents the assets of the authority less the long term capital liabilities.
Credit Default Swaps (CDS)	CDS are bought by investors to insure against defaults (i.e. the counterparty not being able to repay). The higher the cost/premium then the higher the risk – CDS therefore given a market view of the credit worthiness of an organisation.
Credit Ratings	Rating on the ability of an organisation to meet its obligations; ratings are assigned by independent, specialist companies, such as Fitch and Moody's using market intelligence they gather.
Credit Risk	The risk that the debtor will default on their obligations
Counterparty	The organisation that you are conducting your business with.
Debt Management Account Deposit Facility	Provided by the <a href="#">Debt Management Office</a> , users can place cash in secure fixed-term deposits. Deposits are guaranteed by the government and therefore have the equivalent of a sovereign triple-A credit rating.
Derivative Instruments	A security whose price is dependent upon or derived from one or more underlying assets. The derivative itself is merely a contract between two or more parties. Its value is determined by fluctuations in the

	underlying asset. The most common underlying assets include stocks, bonds, commodities, currencies, interest rates and market indexes. Most derivatives are characterized by high leverage. For example, a stock option is a derivative because it derives its value from the value of a stock. An interest rate swap is a derivative because it derives its value from one or more interest rate indices.
Discounts	These relate to Public Works Loans Board loans. If rates have increased since the borrowing was undertaken then part of the benefit that PWLB will achieve from being able to loan out at that higher rate are passed back to an authority if they repay the loan early.
Fund Managers	Independent investment managers who work to a specific mandate and invest funds on behalf of the Council
IFRS	International Financial Reporting Standards, the set of accounting rules in use by UK local authorities since 2010.
Inflation	The rise in prices of goods and services over a period of time.
Interest Rate Risk	The risk that the value of an investment will change due to changes to the interest rate.
Internal Borrowing	This is where the amount of an authority's borrowing is less than its CFR or underlying need to borrow and represents the use of internal balances rather than borrowing from the market.
LIBID	London inter-bank bid rate. Interest rate at which prime banks will <b>borrow</b> money in the London inter-bank market.
LIBOR	London inter-bank offer rate. Interest rate at which prime banks will <b>lend</b> money in the London inter-bank market. Fixed every day by the British Bankers Association to five decimal places.
Liquidity Risk	The risk of not being able to trade an investment quickly to release cash.
LOBO	Lender's Option Borrower's Option – a long term loan where the lender has the option to propose an increase in the interest rate on pre-determined dates. The borrower then has the option to either accept the new rate or repay the loan without penalty. LOBOs increase the borrower's interest rate risk and the loan should therefore attract a lower rate of interest initially.
Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP)	This is the amount charged against the Income and Expenditure Account for the year in relation to the repayment of debt on borrowing in order to fund capital expenditure.

Money Market Fund (MMF)	Mutual funds that invest in short term debt instruments. They offer a higher level of security than banks and interest rates are generally higher.
Obligor	An individual or company that owes debt to another individual or company (the creditor), as a result of borrowing or issuing bonds.
Premia	This is the penalty applied to the early redemption of PWLB loans where rates have fallen since the loan was undertaken.
Prudential Code	A professional code of practice which provides regulatory framework to local authorities on capital expenditure, investments and borrowing activities.
Prudential Indicators	A set of indicators developed within the Prudential Code which define thresholds for investment and borrowing within a local authority.
PWLB	Public Works Loans Board – a Government agency providing long and short term loans to local authorities. Interest rates are generally lower than the private sector and slightly higher than the rates at which the Government themselves may borrow.
Quantitative Easing	This is where the government buy back their own gilt issuance to effectively pump money into the financial markets of the economy.
Re-scheduling	This relates to repaying existing borrowing early and replacing it with borrowing for a different period usually, but not necessarily, at lower rates
Return	The gain from holding an investment over a given period
Security	An investment instrument, other than an insurance policy or fixed annuity, issued by a corporation, government or other organisation which offers evidence of debt or equity.
SONIA	
Sovereign Exposure	Risk of exposure to one particular country.
Supranational Bonds	These are bonds (similar to gilts) issued by multi government development organisations and are supported by all of the governments who form part of the organisation. E.g. European Investment Bank and are usually very secure.
Treasury Management Code (TM Code)	CIPFA's Code of Practice for Treasury Management in the Public Services and Cross-Sectoral Guidance Notes, to which local authorities are required by law to have regard.